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Abstract
This article analyzes the unique legal position of the European Community (EC) in the world trading
system. Its polycephalous anatomy derives from the fact that all 25 Member States of the EC are
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) along with the EC itself. This means that when
referring to the EC, the whole as well as its parts are independent Members of the WTO. This has legal
and political consequences related to the allocation of powers between the national and supranational
levels that will be analyzed. The article explains what is meant by a “mixed agreement” and analyzes the
various existing types of mixed agreements in the field of the European Community’s external relations.
The effects of the EC’s international agreements vis-à-vis third parties are examined. EC Treaty practice
has become increasingly dominated by mixed agreements for they reflect the legal and political reality
that the EC is not a single State for the purposes of international law. Problems raised by mixed
agreements do not exist within the context of exclusive EC competence, but instead relate to the EC’s
functioning. Within the EC treaty-making, there is a tendency to sign mixed agreements rather than pure
Community agreements in areas dealing with the EC external relations. This shows their importance for
the European Community and for its position in the world. The article concludes with some suggestions
on what might be the optimal way to move forward in the complex field of external relations law of the
EC and the European Union (EU).
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I. Introduction

This article aims at providing insight to the European Community’s (EC) position within the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)1 and the World Trade Organization (WTO).2 We will see that
1

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed in 1947, was created by the Bretton Woods meetings that took place in
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire (U.S.), in 1944, setting out a plan for economic recovery after World War II, by encouraging
reduction in tariffs and other international trade barriers. The GATT is one of the three mechanisms for global economic
governance established at Bretton Woods, being the other two the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
The GATT was a collection of rules applied temporarily, without an institutional basis, unlike the WTO, which is a permanent
organization with a permanent framework and its own Secretariat. For almost fifty years, the GATT focused exclusively on
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the EC’s specific problems and challenges for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are partly related to
the EC’s sui generis position in the WTO. In this sense, the opinion of Advocate General Tesauro with
regard to Case Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice is helpful for understanding the unitary
character of the EC’s external trade relations: “The Community legal system is characterized by the
simultaneous application of provisions of various origins, international, Community and national; but it
nevertheless seeks to function and to represent itself to the outside world as a unified system.”3 We shall
see more specifically the problem that the EC faces in its external trade relations by analyzing the socalled “duty of close cooperation” and unity in the Communities’ external relations. We will also deal
with the difficult and old issue of allocation of competences between the EC and its Member States in EC
trade policy.
As a result of the allocation of competences, mixed agreements shall be analyzed, in the latter part
of the article. In this sense, we shall first explain what is meant by a mixed agreement and will see what
Dominic McGoldrick has said in this respect.4 We shall see that the European Community appears to be a

trade in goods, leaving tariffs and quotas aside in the various rounds of negotiations of the world trading system. The GATT
set the terms for countries who wanted to trade with each other. The GATT signatories were called “contracting parties.” The
Uruguay Round, completed in 1994, replaced the GATT with the WTO, a global trade agency with binding enforcements of
comprehensive rules expanding beyond trade. The GATT has now become one of the eighteen agreements enforced by the
WTO.
2
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a global trade agency that was established through the GATT Uruguay Round
Agreement signed in 1994. The WTO provides dispute resolution, administration, and continuing negotiations for the
seventeen substantive agreements that it enforces. The WTO and its underlying agreements set a system of comprehensive
governance that goes far beyond trade rules. It is argued by some commentators (Lori Wallach being one of the most relevant
activists in the public domain) that the WTO system, rules, and procedures are undemocratic and non-transparent. The WTO’s
substantive rules systematically prioritize trade over all other goals and values. Each WTO member is required to ensure “the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures” [WTO Agreement Article XVI (4)] to the WTO’s
substantive rules. National policies and laws found to violate WTO rules must be eliminated or changed; otherwise, the
violating country faces trade sanctions. The economic, social and environmental upheaval being suffered by many countries
that have lived under the WTO regime since 1995 means that business-as-usual at the WTO is over. It remains to be seen
whether the handful of powerful WTO members who have dictated WTO policy since 1995 will adapt to the new reality. By
the same token, it is also unclear whether countries demanding changes to the WTO’s current system of rules that are
damaging their national interests may begin to withdraw if those changes do not take place. Regarding withdrawal from the
WTO Agreement, although Article XV (1) is clear and reads that “Any Member may withdraw from this Agreement. Such
withdrawal shall apply both to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements and shall take effect upon the expiration
of six months from the date on which written notice of withdrawal is received by the Director-General of the WTO,” the
withdrawal from certain rules or agreements is not entirely clear.
3
Tesauro AG in Case C-53/96, Hermès International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV, 1998 E.C.R. I-3603, para. 21.
4
DOMNICK MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, (1997).
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unique creation from the perspective of international law.5 A brief note on the importance of attempting
to reach a proper conception of the mixed procedure shall be made. We shall see the various types of
mixed agreements6 that exist in the field of the external relations of the European Community. We shall
then look into the conclusion and effects of the EC’s international agreements vis-à-vis third parties.
Attention shall be paid to the fact that problems raised by mixed agreements do not exist within the
context of exclusive European Community competence. Some of these problems have to do with the
functioning of the European Community.7 We shall see how the Member States have delegated their
authority to negotiate international trade agreements to the supranational level.8
We shall also see that within the European Community treaty-making, there is a tendency to sign
mixed agreements rather than agreements of European Community exclusive competence in areas dealing
with the external relations of the European Union (EU). This shows their importance for the European
Community and for its position in the world.9 Although the EC increasingly wants to become an
international actor and somehow assert its international personality and identity, it also has to accept that
Member States and third parties have legitimate interests.10 EC Treaty11 practice has become increasingly

5

MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, (1997), at 1.
For types of mixed agreements, see Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International
Law Aspects of the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 128-33 and Schermers, H.G. “A Typology of Mixed
Agreements” in O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 2333.
7
See Meunier, S. "Talking with a Single Voice: European Integration and EC-US Trade Negotiations", Abstract; paper
prepared for delivery at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The Sheraton Washington
Hotel, August, 28-31, 1997.
8
Supranational literally means 'at a level above national governments' – as opposed to 'intergovernmental,' which means
'between or among governments.' Many EU decisions are taken at the supranational level in the sense that they involve the EU
institutions, to which EU Member States have delegated some decision-making powers.
9
Ehlermann, C.D. Mixed Agreements: A List of Problems, in O’Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) MIXED AGREEMENTS,
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, p. 3.
10
The relationship between the EC and third States is a unique experience in international law and international relations.
11
Treaties are usually composed of articles, Protocols and Declarations. As an example we have the Treaty of Amsterdam,
composed of 15 articles, 13 Protocols and 58 Declarations. In the case of the EU, there are currently founding treaties,
amending treaties, accession treaties and budgetary treaties. There is also an EU Constitutional Treaty, which seeks to
consolidate, simplify and replace the existing set of overlapping treaties. It was signed in Rome on October 29, 2004 and is due
to come into force in the near future, conditional on its ratification by all EU Member States. In the meantime, or if the EU
Constitutional Treaty fails to be ratified by all EU Member States, the EU will continue to work on the basis of the current
treaties. As for the founding treaties, there are four of them: the Treaty of Paris (1952), establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), which expired in July 2002; the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom); the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC); [these last two treaties are known as the
Treaties of Rome (1958). However, when the term "Treaty of Rome" or the acronym "TEC" are used, it is to mean only the
6
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dominated by mixed agreements12 for they reflect the legal and political reality that the EC is not a single
State for the purposes of international law.13 We shall see how the EC’s membership and participation in
international organizations14 is highly variable for an organization which pretends to act as a single
actor.15
This article does not deal with treaties that are entered into by the Member States alone (if that
were the case, they would not be mixed agreements stricto sensu), but treaties which in substance cover
matters of exclusive EC competence. If it is not possible to have Community adherence to such treaties
(because the treaty is only open to States), the EC competence may be exercised “through the medium of
the Member States acting jointly in the Community’s interest.”16 Nor does this article deal with treaties
concluded in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), where the EU
technically lacks legal personality.17 However, the situation with respect to the EU legal personality has
fundamentally changed since the enforcement of the Treaty of Amsterdam,18 although Article 24 of the
EEC Treaty]; and the Treaty on European Union (1993) [this Treaty changed the name of the European Economic Community
to simply "the European Community," and introduced new intergovernmental structures to deal with the aspects of common
foreign and security policy, as well as police and judicial cooperation. The structure formed by these so-called Three Pillars
(Community pillar; foreign and security policy; police and judicial cooperation) is the European Union, whose scope then
became more overtly political as well as economic]. With respect to the amending treaties, there are also four of them, which
are: the Merger Treaty (1967), which provided for a Single Commisison and a Single Council of the then three European
Communities; the Single European Act (1987), which provided for the adoptions required for the achievement of the Internal
Market; the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed in 1997), whose purpose was, inter alia, to simplify decision making in addition to
further integrating the common foreign and security policy concept. It also amended and renumbered the EU and EC Treaties;
and the Treaty of Nice (signed in 2001), where qualified majority voting was again extended to more areas, abolishing the
national right to veto in some policy areas. A concept of "enhanced co-operation" was introduced for countries –there must be
at least eight of them- wishing to forge closer links in areas where other EU Member States disagreed or if they are unable or
unwilling to join in at this stage. The outsiders must, however, be free to join in later if they wish. The accession treaties came
into being for every enlargement of the EU. As for budgetary treaties, there have been two: the Budgetary Treaty of 1970,
which gave the European Parliament the last word on what is known as "non-compulsory expenditure;" and the Budgetary
Treaty of 1975, which gave the European Parliament the power to reject the budget as a whole, and created the European Court
of Auditors.
12
MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, (1997), at chapter 5.
13
This is also the case for the EU, “it is difficult to see anything short of a major war provoking a transition to a statehood”,
Hill, C., The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role 31 JCMS, 305-28, p. 325 (1993).
14
For the participation of the EC in International Organizations, see FRID, R. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EC AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. LEGAL THEORY AND PRACTICE, Kluwer Law International, (1995).
15
MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, (1997), at chapters 2
& 10.
16
Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention No. 170 [1993] ECR I-1061, para. 5. See also MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, (1997), at 82-83.
17
Eaton, M.R. Common Foreign and Security Policy, in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.) LEGAL ISSUES OF THE
MAASTRICHT TREATY, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994, p. 224.
18
Rosas, A. The European Union and mixed agreements, in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) THE GENERAL LAW OF EC
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Treaty on European Union (TEU)19 refers to the conclusion of CFSP agreements by the Council.20 The
final subtitle will be devoted to concluding remarks on the issue of mixity in the EC external relations.
This unique legal and political situation, in which the EC and its Member States participate, raises
a number of research questions: is there more legal coherence by having exclusive EC competence21 on
all issues of EC trade policy? Does Article 133 EC after the Nice Treaty suffice to reach the aim of the
EC’s common commercial policy? Is Article 133 EC an adequate legal instrument for the purposes of the
EC’s common commercial policy? If the EC acts together externally, might it help to join internally
within the EU? Would deeper integration of the internal market for, say, services strengthen the
negotiating position of the EC in the international trade arena? How does the political context shape this
legal issue? How does it impact the thinking about the legal solution, taking into account the fact that the
EU is legally federal (i.e., it possesses a federal legal structure) but politically intergovernmental (i.e., it is
an intergovernmental political structure)? What political consequences will the legal outcomes have? In
Amato's view, no member of the EU is powerful enough to be taken seriously on its own in the
international arena. Thus, in order to play an effective role in the world, Europe must join together. In this

EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 203.
19
Article 24 TEU reads:
1. When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international organisations in implementation of
this title, the Council may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that
effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council on a recommendation from the Presidency.
2. The Council shall act unanimously when the agreement covers an issue for which unanimity is required for the adoption of
internal decisions.
3. When the agreement is envisaged in order to implement a joint action or common position, the Council shall act by a
qualified majority in accordance with Article 23(2).
4. The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI. When the agreement covers an issue for
which a qualified majority is required for the adoption of internal decisions or measures, the Council shall act by a qualified
majority in accordance with Article 34(3).
5. No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the
requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall
nevertheless apply provisionally.
6. Agreements concluded under the conditions set out by this Article shall be binding on the institutions of the Union.
20
Paasivirta, The European Union: From an Aggregate of States to a Legal Person?, 2 Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium,
1997, pp. 37-59.
21
On the issue of coherence and external competences generally, see Gauttier, P. “Horizontal Coherence and the External
Competences of the European Union,” European Law Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 23-41, 2004.
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sense, coordinating its foreign trade policies and streamlining the process was one of Amato's major
ambitions during the Convention on the future of Europe.22

II. The Problem of the EU in its External Relations

With two remaining Communities23 (currently there are only two Communities24 since the European Coal
and Steel Community [ECSC] Treaty expired on July 23, 2002),25 one Union, and three different pillars
of competences and decision-making, it is no wonder that third parties are often puzzled.26 In order to
avoid this chaos, it was proposed at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference of 1996-97 to create a
single legal entity, the European Union, just like the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade
22

See conversation with Giuliano Amato in the framework of a seminar held at NYU Law School on March 26, 2002 under
the title “The Futures of Europe: Ideas, Ideals and Those Who Make Them Happen,” in
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/seminar/02/Amato_script.rtf (last visited June 20, 2005).
23
In the 1950s, six European countries decided to pool their economic resources and set up a system of joint decision-making
on economic issues. To do so, they formed three organizations. European Communities is the name given collectively to these
three organizations, i.e., the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), when in 1967, they were first merged under a single institutional
framework with the Merger Treaty. They formed the basis of what is today the European Union.
The EEC soon became the most important of these three communities, and was eventually renamed simply the “European
Community” by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which at the same time effectively made the European Community the first of
three pillars of the European Union, called the Community (or Communities) pillar. Subsequent treaties added further areas of
competence that extended beyond the purely economic areas. The other two communities remained extremely limited: for that
reason, often little distinction is made between the European Community and the European Communities as a whole.
Furthermore, in 2002 the ECSC ceased to exist with the expiration of the Treaty of Paris which established it. Seen as
redundant, no effort was made to retain it — its assets and liabilities were transferred to the EC, and coal and steel became
subject to the EC Treaty.
24
In fact, the two remaining Communities work as one entity which functions in the framework of two Treaties, even if they
are legally different. In this sense, legally binding agreements concluded by the EC are still signed on behalf of one or both of
the existing Communities. It must be said clearly that the EC, and not the EU, is a member of the World Trade Organization or
regional fisheries organizations, to give just two examples. In this respect, see Sack, J. “The European Community’s
Membership of International Organizations”, Common Market Law Review, 32, 1995, pp. 1227-1256.
25
See the decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the EU Member States, meeting within the Council, on 27
February 2002 on the financial consequences of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty and on the research fund for coal and steel at
2002/234/ECSC, Official Journal of the European Communities L 79, Vol. 45, 22 March 2002, in http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_079/l_07920020322en00420059.pdf
(last
visited
June
17,
2005).
Also
see,
http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/misc/74346.pdf, p. 2.
26 For a comprehensive study on the ramifications of the expiration of the ECSC, see Ubertazzi, B. “The End of the ECSC,”
European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 8 (2004) N° 20, at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-020a.htm (last visited February
15, 2006), as well as Groenendijk N. and Hospers G.J., “A requiem for the European Coal and Steel Community,” in The
Economist 2002, 601-612. Also, Meunier, S., «La Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier est morte, vive la
fédération européenne», in Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 2001, 509-515; Obwexer, W., «Das Ende der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl», in Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2002, 517-524; Vallterra
M.C., «La disolución de la Comunidad Europea del carbón y del acero: estado actual», in Revista de Derecho Comunitario
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Organization (WTO). This proposal was perceived as a possible transfer of sovereignty in the field of
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).27 Unfortunately, this discussion focused on the question of
the exercise of competence, and the idea of the EU as a single actor (legal person) does not prejudge the
powers of the EU in, say, the common foreign and security policy.
At Maastricht, it was not possible for Member States to accomplish a common foreign and
security policy in the framework of the traditional mechanisms of Community institutions and
Community law.28 The second pillar29 of the EU does not presently provide for a real supranational
decision-making by majority voting. It utilizes unanimity as a decision-making system with the
possibility of common positions30 (Article 12 TEU)31 and joint actions32 (Article 13 TEU).33
Europeo 2002, 393-432.
27
Garbagnati Ketvel, “The Jurisdiction of the ECJ in Respect of the CFSP,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 77
(2006); Thym, “Beyond Parliament’s Reach? The Role of the European Parliament in the CFSP,” European Foreign Affairs
Review 109 (2006).
28
These mechanisms are known in the Community institutions as those of the First Pillar.
29
The so-called “second pillar” refers to the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the EU.
30
The common position in the context of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is designed to make cooperation
more systematic and improve its coordination. The EU Member States are required to comply with and uphold such positions
which have been adopted unanimously at the Council.
For reasons of simplification, the EU Constitutional Treaty which is in the process of being ratified restricts CFSP instruments
to European decisions and international agreements. Once the EU Constitutional Treaty enters into force, common positions
and their implementation will be based on European decisions (non-legislative instruments) adopted by the Council of
Ministers.
31
Article 12 TEU reads:
The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 by:
defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy,
- deciding on common strategies,
- adopting joint actions,
- adopting common positions,
- strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.
32
Joint action, which is a legal instrument under Title V of the Treaty on European Union (common foreign and security
policy, CFSP), means coordinated action by the EU Member States whereby all kinds of resources (human resources, knowhow, financing, equipment, et cetera) are mobilized in order to attain specific objectives set by the Council, on the basis of
general guidelines from the European Council.
For reasons of simplification, the EU Constitutional Treaty, which is in the process of being ratified, restricts CFSP
instruments to European decisions and international agreements. Once the EU Constitutional Treaty enters into force, joint
actions and the implementation of such action will therefore be based on European decisions (non-legislative instruments)
adopted by the Council of Ministers.
33
Article 13 TEU reads:
1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy,
including for matters with defence implications.
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member
States have important interests in common.
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member
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It is the Treaty of Amsterdam which attempts to strengthen these mechanisms without implying
major changes in this respect.34 One major change is that the Council of the EU may adopt joint actions or
common positions by qualified majority if they are based on a common strategy decided upon by the
European Council.35 However, in adopting a common strategy, the European Council36 must be
unanimous, which diminishes the practical importance of this innovation. In addition to that, any Member
State can declare that for “important and sated qualified reasons of national policy” it will oppose the
adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, in which case such decision shall not be taken.
Another important change at Amsterdam is that the Secretary-General of the Council will assist
the Presidency of the Council in matters dealing with the common foreign and security policy (Article
18.3 TEU37).38 It is still unknown whether the High Representative for the common foreign and security
policy will bring more coherence to the EU. One wonders how much coherence can be found in a system
in which the Presidency will continue to assert its own role, the High Representative wishes to play an
important role, and the Commission continues to be the representative of the EC in the first pillar,39 as
well as fully associated with the second pillar, and therefore has its own voice.
The Amsterdam Treaty also implies that parts of the third pillar40 have been transferred to the first
pillar.41 This means that Community competence and supranational Community law are growing. The

States.
3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on
the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council.
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them, in particular by adopting
joint actions and common positions.
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.
34
See Monar, J. “The European Union’s Foreign Affairs System after the Treaty of Amsterdam: A “Strengthened Capacity for
External Action”?”, 2 European Foreign Affairs Review 1997, pp. 413-436. In this article, on page 434 the author concludes
that, for the EU’s foreign affairs system, the Treaty of Amsterdam “brings only fragments of a reform.”
35
Rosas, A. “The External Relations of the European Union: Problems and Challenges” in The Forum for US-EU LegalEconomic Affairs, The Mentor Group, 1998, p. 62.
36
Not to mix with the Council of the EU. The European Council consists of the Head of State and Government of the 25 EU
Member States.
37
Article 18.3 TEU reads: The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise the
function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy.
38
See European Union. Selected Instruments Taken from the Treaties, Book I, Volume I, 1999, in http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/treaties/dat/treaties_en.pdf (last visited September 3, 2005).
39
This is the so-called Community pillar.
40
The so-called "third pillar" refers to matters of police and judicial cooperation in the EU.
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matters transferred from the third to the first pillar cover the entry of third-country nationals (visas,
asylum, and immigration policy). This shows that, although the transfer of the second pillar to the first
may still seem remote, a gradual merger in one form or another of the two pillars seems inevitable for the
construction of Europe.
Instead of being faced with two “international organizations” (the remaining two Communities),
and the EU as an umbrella concept for these organizations as well as the second and third pillars, third
States are now facing two organizations (the Communities) and a third legal (?) person (the EU), which
appears as a different entity from the Communities. This situation hardly corresponds to the basic
institutional principles of the TEU, such as Article 1.3 TEU42 or Article 3.2 TEU.43 From this, we can
deduce that there is a need for clarification and for more coherence to the institutional image of the EU in
the outside world.44

41

The first pillar contains Title IV on “Visas, Asylum, Immigration and Other Policies Related to Free Movement of Persons.”
Article 1.3 TEU predicates that “The Union shall be founded on the European Communities”.
43
Article 3.2 TEU reads that “The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole”.
44
There is a vast body of literature on this matter, especially the work of the European Convention on the future of Europe,
Working Group III on the EU’s legal personality, guided by Professor Amato. Other literature, Rama Montaldo M.,
International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International Organizations, in BYIL 1970, 111; What follows is a nonexhaustive indication of readings I have come across in the field of EC external trade relations: Allen, J.J., The European
Common Market and the GATT, The University Press of Washington, D. C., 1960; Bekemans, L. & Tsoukalis, L. (eds.)
Europe and Global Economic Interdependence, College of Europe and European University Press, 1993; Bourgeois, J.H.J.
“The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: an Echternach Procession”, Common Market Law Review 32, 1995, pp. 763787; Dashwood, A. “External Relations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty,” Common Market Law Review 35, 1998, pp.
1019-1045; Da Fonseca-Wollheim, H. & Krenzler, H. “Die Reichweite der gemainsamen Handelspolitik nach dem Vertrag
von Amsterdam- eine Debatte ohne Ende”, Europarecht 1998, pp. 223 ff.; Demaret, P. Relations extérieures de la
Communauté européenne et marché intérieur: aspects juridiques et fonctionnels, Story-Scientia, 1986; Heidensohn, K. Europe
and World Trade, Pinter, 1995; Henig, S. External Relations of the European Community. Associations and Trade
Agreements, Chatham House: PEP, 1971; Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans l'Union
Europeenne, in http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html, 1998; Pescatore, P. “Opinion 1/94 on “Conclusion” of the WTO
Agreement: is there an Escape from a programmed Disaster?”, Common Market Law Review 36, 1999, pp. 387-405;
Petersmann, E.-U. “Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities”, Common Market Law
Review 20, 1983, pp. 397-437; Piris, J.-C. “La Capacité de l’Union Europeenne de s’engager et d’agir en Matiere de Relations
Economiques Exterieures: l’example de l’OMC”, Florence, Academy of European Law, Coference given by Jean-Claude Piris,
Jurisconsult of the Council of the European Union, on the 15th July 1998; Völker, E.L.M. Barriers to External and Internal
Community Trade, Kluwer, 1993; Völker, E.L.M., (ed.) Protectionism and the European Community, Kluwer Law and
Taxation Publishers, 1987; Woolcock, S. Market Access Issues in EC-US Relations. Trading Partners or Trading Blows?,
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991.
42
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A. On Foreign Policy45

Under international law, international organizations can have international personality, that is, rights and
duties under the Public International system of law.46 In this respect, the major international law
precedent on the international personality of public international law institutions is the Reparations for
injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations case.47 Since the EC is an “international
organization,” it can be given explicit legal personality by a treaty which has created it. Concerning third
States, what counts is the international practice of the organization and the links that such an organization
creates with these third States.48 This practice and its links will (or will not) create the organization’s
international legal personality.
In September 1948, Count Bernadotte was the Chief United Nations Truce Negotiator in
Jerusalem. He was killed by a gang of private terrorists. The United Nations General Assembly asked for
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice to bring an international claim concerning
injuries suffered by its employees in circumstances involving the responsibility of a State.49 Although the
UN Charter does not expressly confer legal personality on the United Nations Organization, the Court
examined the Charter as a whole and concluded that the UN was an international entity holding
international rights and obligations, and capable of maintaining its rights by bringing international claims.
The Court pronounced itself as follows:
45

Wessel, The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective, Kluwer Law International,
1999; Denza, E. The Intergovernmental Pillars of the EU, Oxford University Press, 2000; Tizzano, A. “The Foreign Relations
Law of the EU: between supranationality and intergovernmental model,” in Cannizzaro, E. (ed.) The European Union as an
Actor in International Relations, Kluwer Law International, 2002; Hill, C. “The EU’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention,” 6
European Foreign Affairs Review, 315 (2001); Soetendorp, Foreign Policy in the European Union: Theory, History and
Practice, Longmans, 1999; Timmermans, “The EU and Public International Law,” 4 European Foreign Affairs Review 181
(1994).
46
See Schermers, H.G. & Blokker, N. M., International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, 3rd edn, The Hague, Nijhoff,
1995, pp. 976-82; White, N. The Law of International Organisations, Manchester University Press, 1996.
47
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174. For an explanation on the Reparations Case, see McGoldrick, D. International
Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, pp. 26-8.
48
See Jennings, R.Y. & Watts, A. (eds.) Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edition, Harlow, Longman, 1992, specifically pp.
117-329.
49
McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, at p. 27.
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Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusion that the Organisation is an international
person. That is not the same as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal
personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State…Whereas a State possesses the
totality of international rights and duties recognised by international law, the rights and duties of
an entity such as the Organisation must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or
implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.50

So the question is: what, then, is the European Union? For the time being, it is just the institutional
and political framework in which all EC's and certain (and only certain) Member States' competences are
exercised. In the near future, once the EU Constitutional Treaty is implemented – or a similar legal
document, if the Constitutional Treaty will never see the light of day - the Union will be more than just a
simple framework and, therefore, will become an actor with its own legal personality and competences.
Let me try to explain this argument by giving the example of former Yugoslavia.
Firstly, if we think of sending military forces, then we are dealing with the 25 Member States of the
Union acting outside the institutional system of the Union. However, one should not exclude the
possibility that sending troops to former Yugoslavia may have a link with the common foreign and
security policy. The borderline between Member States acting on their own, outside the institutional
framework of the Union, and Member States acting within the political and institutional framework of the
Union is not very clear. Secondly, if we refer to the "European Administration" of the town of Mostar,
then we are dealing with Member States' competences in the framework of the EU. Thirdly, if we look at
the commercial regime applicable to the republics of former Yugoslavia, then we are dealing with the
EC's competences.
These examples should illustrate the danger of an indiscriminate use of the expression “the
European Union does...” Such an expression does not let us know who really does what: what does the
EC as such do? What do the 25 Member States together do in the framework of the Union? What do both
Member States and the Community together do? Obviously it would be even worse to use the expression

12

EC Polycephalous Anatomy

Rafael Leal-Arcas

“European Union” when making reference to the Member States outside the EU’s institutional
framework. Again, knowing the precise answer to these questions is vital, since the nature, as well as the
legal and political consequences of this action, is completely different, depending on who acts.51 To
defend this argument, allow me to suggest two examples:
Example 1: "The European Union reacts to the Helms-Burton52 and d'Amato Acts.53" This statement
could mean:
a.- that the Community and the Member States both react to these two legislations, each with their
own legal and political means; or
b.- that Member States cede their responsibilities to appear behind a single action conducted by the
Community. As a matter of fact, the Community has very limited competences regarding such issues as
the Helms-Burton or d'Amato Acts. Therefore, its action has very little effect or repercussion.
Example 2: “Agreements between the European Union and Mercosur,54 and the European Union
and the Andean Community.55”
This expression does not reveal the main difference between both agreements. The agreement
with Mercosur is an agreement signed between the EC and the Member States on the European side, and
Mercosur and its Member States on the South American side, whereas the agreement with the Andean
Pact and its Member States has been signed only by the European Community on the European side. In
other words, EC Member States have not participated in this second agreement. Therefore, the first
50

Reparations Case: Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949] ICJ Rep. pp. 179-80.
Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans l'Union Europeenne,
http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html, 1998, chapter 1, subtitle 1.1.
52
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (better known as the Helms-Burton Act) is a United
States law which strengthens and continues the United States embargo against Cuba.
53
The d'Amato Act refers to the economic embargo by the U.S. government against companies of third countries investing in
gas or oil in Iran and Libya.
54
MERCOSUR stands for Mercado Comun del Sur (Common Market of the Southern Cone) and is composed of Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. On 9 December 2005, Venezuela was accepted as a new member, but it will be officialized
in late 2006. It was founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion, which was later amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of
Ouro Preto. Its purpose is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, peoples, and currency.
55
The Andean Community is a trade bloc comprising until recently 5 South American countries: Venezuela, Colombia, Peru,
Ecuador and Bolivia. In 2006, Venezuela announced its withdrawal, reducing the Andean Community to 4 member states. The
trade bloc was called the Andean Pact until 1996, and came into existence with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement in
51

13

EC Polycephalous Anatomy

Rafael Leal-Arcas

agreement has a greater scope than the second one. The same difference exists between the
Euromediterranean Agreements of the EC and its Member States with Tunisia,56 Morocco, Israel and
other countries, as well as the Euromediterranean Agreement with the PLO (Palestinian Liberation
Organization).57 The latter agreement was signed by only the EC (and not the EC and its Member States),
and has a lesser scope than the former agreements, since the EU Member States do not participate in the
agreement.
It is thus of vital importance to make certain linguistic clarifications which will ease the
understanding of what we are trying to explain:
a.- the expression “The Union does humanitarian work” actually means “The Community and/or
its Member States, acting together in the framework of the European Union, do humanitarian work;”
b.- the expression “The Union and its Member States” is rather confusing since the Union includes
the Member States; however, we can speak of “the Community and its Member States.” Here we mean 26
different legal entities, each one of them having legal personality;
c.- we can use the expression “The Union and its Member States act individually;” by this we
understand activities carried out within the framework of the Union (by the Community and/or the
Member States acting together), and activities carried out by the Member States outside the framework of
the Union.
That said, the success of the EU on unity in commercial policy seems to be inextricably linked to
its success with a coherent foreign policy.58 In fact, as is evidenced in the famous bananas and hormones
1969. Its headquarters are located in Lima, Peru.
56
OJ L 97/1998, p. 1.
57
OJ L 187/1997, p. 1.
58
See generally Koutrakos, P. Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence, Hart, 2001, chapters 2-7; Tietje, “The Concept of
Coherence in the TEU and the CFSP,” 2 European Foreign Affairs Review, 211 (1997); Paarsivirta, E. & Rosas, A.
“Sanctions, Countermeasures and Related Actions in the External Relations of the EU: A Search for Legal Frameworks,” in
Cannizzaro, E. (ed.) The European Union as an Actor in International Relations, Kluwer Law International, 2002; Pavoni,
“UN Sanctions in EU and National Law: The Centro-Com Case,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 582 (1999);
Monar, J. “The European Union’s Foreign Affairs System after the Teaty of Amsterdam: A ‘Strengthened Capacity for
External Action’?” 2 European Foreign Affairs Review 413 (1997); Wessel, “The International Legal Status of the EU,” 2
European Foreign Affairs Review 109 (1997); Wessel, “Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU,” 5 European
Foreign Affairs Review 507 (2000); Neuwahl, N. “A Partner with a Troubled Personality: EU Treaty-Making in Matters of
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disputes, both the political and economic aspects of the EU’s external relations are inseparable. At what
was called the European Summit59 in The Hague in December 1969, the heads of State and Government
of the six original Member States asked their ministers of foreign affairs to study how progress could best
be made in the area of political unification. 60 Their report was a proposal for cooperation in the area of
foreign policy, which became the basis of what, for 25 years, would be called European Political
Cooperation (EPC).61 The procedure was purely intergovernmental and based on unanimity, a constraint
reflecting a strong belief that foreign policy decisions remained under the sovereign competence of
national governments.62
John Peterson and Helene Sjursen argue that the move from European Political Cooperation
(EPC) -in retrospect, a strikingly anodyne construction- to the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) was propelled by ambitions to create a “common” EU foreign policy analogous to, say, the
common agricultural policy or common commercial policy.63 Yet, French national foreign policy
decisions to test nuclear weapons in the Pacific, send troops to Bosnia, or propose a French candidate to
head the European Central Bank could be viewed as far more momentous and consequential than
anything agreed upon within the CFSP between 1995 and 1997. It is plausible to suggest, as David Allen
does, that the EU simply does not have a “foreign policy”64 in the accepted sense of the term. Going one
step further, the CFSP may be described, perhaps dismissed, as a “myth.”65 It does not, as the Maastricht

CFSP and JHA after Amsterdam,” 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 177 (1998).
59
European (or EU) Summits are the meetings of heads of State and government (i.e., presidents and/or prime ministers,
depending on what their national constitutions indicate) of all EU countries, plus the President of the European Commission. In
today's EU politics, summits are embodied in the European Council, which meets, in principle, four times a year to agree upon
overall EU policy and to review progress. The European Council is the highest-level policy-making body in the European
Union, which is why its meetings are often called “summits.”
60
EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN EUROPE
(Walter Carlsnaes & Steve Smith eds., 1994).
61
For a description and analysis of such foreign policy co-ordination, see EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION IN
THE 1980S: A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR WESTERN EUROPE? (Alfred Pijpers et al. eds., 1988).
62
L’UNION EUROPEENNE ET LE MONDE APRES AMSTERDAM (Marianne Dony ed., 1999).
63
Peterson, J. & Sjursen, H. “Conclusion. The Myth of the CFSP?”, in PETERSON, J. & SJURSEN, H. (EDS.) A COMMON
FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? COMPETING VISIONS OF THE CFSP, Routledge, 1998, p. 169.
64
Allen, D, `Who speaks for Europe? The search for an effective and coherent foreign policy' in Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H.
(eds), A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? COMPETING VISIONS OF THE CFSP, London, Routledge, 1998.
65
Id.
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Treaty promises, cover “all areas of foreign and security policy.”66 Obviously, it is not always supported
“actively and unreservedly by its Member States in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.”67
That said, and knowing that the presumption in the European Union is to have collective action, is
there really a “common” European interest? If so, is this interest so great as to assume that in certain
circumstances Member States will act with a single voice? Do Member States have enough proximity in
their national interests to act with one voice in the international sphere?
Following the same authors,68 the European Union has not yet reached its apogee in terms of its
ability to act with power and unity in international affairs. However, some competences are exclusively of
the European Community. Customs duties and protective non-tariff barriers (NTBs)69 such as quantitative
limits, safety norms, health, and hygiene standards, were and are fixed by the Union as a whole, not by
the individual Member States.
Although the Single European Act in 1987 established a legal basis for EPC, it remained largely
unchanged and intergovernmental. Only when the EC faced the challenge of Central and Eastern Europe
and the Iraqi crisis in 1990 and 1991 was more thought given to increasing cooperation in foreign policy.
The result was the “implementation of a common foreign and security policy including eventual framing
of a common defence policy . . .” (Article B TEU).70 The fact that Title V of the Treaty on the European
Union brought foreign policy under the umbrella of the EU represents a step forward in clarity. Having
more transparent instruments is the result of requiring Member States to conform to common positions of
the Council of Ministers.71 Through joint actions, the Member States are committed to acting in support
of these common positions. Finally, provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty give the CFSP a clearer

66

Id.
Id.
68
John Peterson & Helene Sjursen.
69
NTBs are government measures or policies other than tariffs that restrict or distort international trade. Examples are import
quotas, discriminatory government procurement practices, technical and scientific barriers related to plant health,
environmental labelling, codes and standards, inter alia.
70
Official Journal C 191 of 29 July 1992.
71
A Council common position is the provisional position agreed by the EU Council after the first reading stage of legislation,
that is, after taking account of any amendments proposed or opinions offered by the European Parliament.
67
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character by creating a High Representative of EU foreign policy (Title V of the consolidated version of
the Treaty on European Union), assisted by a new policy planning and early warning unit in the
Secretariat of the EU Council.72
The whole purpose of creating the CFSP was to enable the EU Member States to speak with one
voice by creating a new entity which would do this on their behalf.73 The Amsterdam Treaty brought
limited majority voting for implementing foreign policy once it has been agreed to in outline by
unanimity (Title V of the consolidated version of the Treaty of Amsterdam),74 and the definition and
implementation of a foreign policy position have been helped further along by the existence of EC policy
instruments, in particular, the budget.75 For example, the EC instruments advanced external policy with
respect to the Mediterranean and to the New Transatlantic Agenda76 between the EU and the U.S., and
enhanced cooperation with Asia through the ASEAN Initiative (Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Declaration, of August 8, 1967).77 In addition, the EU’s political relations with Central and Eastern
Europe have been focused through Europe Agreements negotiated under the EC’s competence.78

72

Treaty of Amsterdam, declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1,
132.
73
Wessel, R. “The Multi-Level Constitution of European Foreign Relations,” EUI Workshop Paper, April 2002, pp. 1-35, at
22.
74
TEU Title V.
75
For more details, see Nuttall, European Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 2000; Schmalz, “The Amsterdam
Provisions on External Coherence: Bridging the Union’s Foreign Policy Dualism?” 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 421
(1998); Crowe, “Some Reflections on the CFSP,” 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 319 (1998); Canor, “The Relationship
Between International Law and European Law: The Incorporation of UN Sanctions Against Yugoslavia into EC Law Through
the Perspective of the ECJ,” 35 Common Market Law Review 137 (1998); Cremona, M. “The Common Foreign and Security
Policy of the European Union and the External Relations Powers of the European Community,” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P.
(eds.) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994; Regelsberger & Wessels, R. “The CFSP
Institutions and Procedures: A Third Way for the Second Pillar,” 1 European Foreign Affairs Review 29 (1996); Ginsberg
“Conceptualising the EU as an International Actor,” 37 Journal of Common Market Studies 429 (1999); Zielonka, J. (ed.)
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, Kluwer, 1998; Curtin & Dekker “The EU as a ‘Layered’ International Organization:
Institutional Unity in Disguise,” in Craig, P. & de Burca, G. (eds.) The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford University Press, 1999;
Kronenberger, V. & Wouters (eds.) The European Union and Conflict Prevention – Policy and Legal Aspects, Asser Press,
2004.
76
The New Transatlantic Agenda, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 6, No. 49, 894-96 (December 4, 1995).
77
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 1233.
78
Kennedy & Webb, “The Limits of Integration: Eastern Europe and the European Communities,” 30 Common Market Law
Review 1095 (1993); Maresceau & Montaguti, “The Relations Between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe: A Legal
Appraisal,” 32 Common Market Law Review 1327 (1995); Volkai, J. “The Application of the European Agreement and
European Law in Hungary: the Judgment of an Activist Constitutional Court on Activist Notions,” Jean Monnet Working
Paper No. 8/99, 1999, available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990801.html#fn0 (last visited August 30,
2006); Inglis, “The Europe Agreements compared in the light of their pre-accession reorientation,” Common Market Law
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The EC’s achievements in assisting other nations have been significant. Under the CFSP in 1995,
the EU gave Russia U.S.$ 1.5 billion to assist its transition to democracy. In 1996 European humanitarian
aid totaled almost U.S.$ 2 billion. Because Member States have proved reluctant to contribute to CFSP
action from national budgets, EC financing has become the norm, which means that de facto, there is an
indirect communitarization of CFSP as the Commission presents the budget, and the European Parliament
decides non-obligatory expenditures. In theory, CFSP has augmented the EU’s competence to act in
external matters. In practice, without the political will necessary to adapt the decision-making machinery
or to use it effectively, CFSP has done more to raise and to disappoint expectations, than it has to enhance
the EU’s international role.79
However, unity in foreign policy is a dramatic step forward and has made it easier for the EC to
unify on commercial issues. As mentioned earlier, there are several areas where this cohesion is likely to
spill over and impact the international arena. One example is that of competition policy, an area in which
the Commission has been active since the early 1960s. With increasing worldwide economic
interdependency and the emergence of global markets for a large number of products, more competition
cases involve actions that take place outside of the EU,80 like the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merger.
In this respect, the EC-U.S. Cooperation Agreement (which provides the background for the McDonnell
Douglas case) is worth mentioning. Competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic examined the
issue, and came to different conclusions. This case shows that even in carrying out policies that have
traditionally been domestic, the EU is increasingly influencing economic matters in other parts of the
world.

Review 1173 (2000); Weiss, “The Chapter on Establishment in the Europe Agreements,” 6 European Foreign Affairs Review
243 (2001).
79
The Treaty of Amsterdam: Text and Commentary (Andrew Duff ed., 1997).
80
PIET EECKHOUT, THE EUROPEAN INTERNAL MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1994).

18

EC Polycephalous Anatomy

Rafael Leal-Arcas

In addition, nowhere is the effect of domestic policies likely to be as relevant as with the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).81 The EMU is essentially a domestic issue. However, EC
authorities hope that the Euro will benefit international trade, having a major impact both on international
markets, and on the weight attributed to the EU as an international actor. That said, the variable geometry
of the EMU with its ins and outs poses a challenge for the unity of external representation in the
economic sphere.82 To better understand the implications of the unitary character of the EU (or lack
thereof), we must look at the legal interpretation of its role and responsibility.

B.- The Case of External Economic Relations

It is also important to say a few words about what Torrent calls the "fourth pillar" of the EU's institutional
structure. If the reader studies the Maastricht Treaty,83 he or she will perceive that the CFSP has a very
large scope, and that it covers the actions of EU Member States in the areas of external economic
relations.84 In fact,
1. Article 12 (ex-Article J.2) of the Maastricht Treaty refers to "any matter of foreign and security
policy" and to "actions in international organisations and at international conferences" without
exception (therefore, without excluding economic conferences);85
81

PAUL BRETON ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A EUROPEAN TEXT (1997).
NICHOLAS EMILIOU & DAVID O´KEEFFE, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAW: AFTER TH
GATT URUGUAY ROUND (1996).
83
The numbering of the Maastricht Treaty Articles is not the original one, but follows the changes made by the postMaastricht Intergovernmental Conferences.
84
Winter, J., Curtin, D., Kellermann, A. & de Witte, B. (eds.) Reforming the Treaty on European Union. The Legal Debate,
Kluwer Law International, 1996.
85
Article 12 (ex-Article J.2) of the Maastricht Treaty reads:
82

1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of
general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and
convergent action.
2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position.
Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.
3. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall
uphold the common positions in such fora.
In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take
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2. Article 13 of the Maastricht Treaty also has a general scope;86 and finally,
3. Article 3 of the Maastricht Treaty establishes that "the Union shall in particular ensure the
consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security,
economic and development policies."87

However, no one has given such a broad interpretation of the CFSP. Why is this so? An authentic
interpretation of the CFSP is one that addresses in the best of all possible ways, the interests of those civil
servants who had to put the CFSP in action:
1. from the point of view of the EU's national Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the idea was to "keep"
the CFSP for them, even if they did not like it so much;
2. from the point of view of the Commission, there was only one strategy concerning the external
economic relations, i.e., to extend the exclusive competence of the European Community as far
as possible. This strategy was incompatible with an efficient co-ordination of the external
economic policies of the Member States in the framework of the CFSP.

part shall uphold the common positions.
86
Article 13 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union reads:
1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy,
including for matters with defence implications.
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member
States have important interests in common.
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member
States.
3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on
the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council.
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them, in particular by adopting
joint actions and common positions.
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.
87
Article 3 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union reads: The Union shall be served by a single
institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its
objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire.
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations,
security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such
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It is this restrictive interpretation of the CFSP which necessarily provokes the development of
what Torrent calls the "fourth pillar" of the EU.88 The term restrictive does not suggest a possible
inclination of the CFSP toward the EC competences, but rather toward the side of the Member States
acting outside the institutional framework of the EU. The so-called "fourth pillar" shows how within the
institutional framework of the EU, the de facto common exercise of Member States' competences is
mainly, but not exclusively, on issues of external economic relations. We may illustrate this with two
very significant examples taken from multilateral and bilateral relations:
1. when dealing with the management of the World Trade Organization Agreements, it is the
Council of Ministers of the European Union which acts not only on behalf of the EC, but also on
behalf of the Member States in the matters in which they are competent;
2. the Association Agreements with the republics of the former Soviet Union deal mainly with the
agreed treatment to the enterprises. This issue reveals Member States' competences. Proof of it
lies in Opinion 2/92 of the European Court of Justice of 24 March 1995,89 which deals with the
competence of the Community or of one of its institutions to participate in the third revised
decision of the Council of the OECD90 concerning national treatment. These agreements have
been negotiated and are integrally managed after their conclusion by the Council of the
European Union and the European Commission.

Torrent justifies the existence of a fourth pillar by saying that the exercise of Member States'
external economic competences within the institutional framework of the EU does not show signs of

consistency and shall cooperate to this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its
respective powers.
88
One interesting point by Professor Torrent is the fact that making reference to the "fourth pillar" of the Union shows how the
language of "three pillars" does not let us comprehend correctly the nature of the European Union.
89
ECR I-521.
90
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a forum of 30 countries for discussion of
economic policies between industrialized market economies, sharing a commitment to democratic government and the market
economy.
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being part of the "third pillar," "second pillar,"91 or "first pillar."92 Therefore, we must speak of a fourth
pillar, if we wish to continue the linguistic usage of pillars.
However, there are at least three comments to make regarding what has been said so far:
- first comment: a clear distinction between the scope of EC competences and the range of
application of the EC Treaty must be made. Let us make use of two examples in order to explain this
distinction.
Example one: Articles 149, 150 (education, vocational training, and youth), 151 (culture),93 and
152 EC (public health)94 limit the Community's competence. Any kind of harmonization of legal
provisions of the Member States is excluded from the scope of these Articles. However, this limitation
does not mean that the national legislations in culture, education or health exceed the range of application
of the treaties. They must respect the general principle of non-discrimination based on nationality, and its
specific translation in the field of the four freedoms in EU law.95
Example two: concerning the criminal legislation of Member States, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) has established that Member States must respect the general principles of EC law. If, for example,
an infraction to customs regulations, before 1st January 1993 –date of completion of the internal
market- was liable to a fine applicable to intra-Community trade, it should respect the principle of

91

Even less so in the second pillar if we take into account the restrictive interpretation which has been given to the CFSP,
which is the second pillar.
92
It could not be part of this pillar since we are dealing precisely with the exercise of Member States' competences, and not
with that of the Community's.
93
In cultural policy, the EC must contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the EU Member States, while respecting their
national and regional diversity and bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.
94
The EC action, which complements national policies, must be directed toward improving public health, preventing human
illness and diseases, as well as obviating sources of danger to human health.
95
Let us remember for the non-specialized reader that the four freedoms are the free movement of goods, the free movement of
persons, the free movement of capital and the freedom to provide services. This is certainly one of the great achievements of
the EU, which has been able to create a frontier-free area within which people, goods, services and money can all move around
freely.

22

EC Polycephalous Anatomy

Rafael Leal-Arcas

proportionality. The conclusions by the Advocate-General Van Gerven in the case 212/8896 have a
general appreciation for he Court's decisions over this issue.
The distinction made by these two examples shows that Community treaties have two different
functions. On the one hand, the typical function of an international treaty, i.e., to limit the exercise of the
competences of the contracting parties (in other words, of the Member States when they are competent).
On the other hand, the specific function of transferring a competence to the Community. This function of
transferring competences to the Community is very specific, but not exclusive of Community treaties.
The fact of not making this distinction has generated very generalized mistakes in the analysis of the
distribution of external competences between the Community and its Member States. There was no
distinction between the range of application of the treaties and the scope of EC competences. This
mistake had terrible consequences when combined with the also mistaken thesis by which non-exclusive
EC competences become exclusive competences when there is a need to act at the international level. The
combination of these two mistakes was the genesis of the thesis by which all the Agreements of the
Uruguay Round were exclusive EC competence.
- second comment: it should be underlined that there is a fine line between what EU Member
States do outside and inside the institutional system of the EU. The earlier example of former Yugoslavia
is helpful here. Certain EU Member States decided to send troops outside the institutional system of the
Union. But to what extent have the diplomatic initiatives from the various EU Member States been inside
or outside the framework of the CFSP? And who pays for what in this same example? The same case
would apply mutatis mutandis to participation in the Middle Eastern peace process. The best example of
Member States' activities which are borderline with the Union's institutional system is the EU's
participation in the UN.
- third comment: when analyzing the Schengen Agreement, we can observe how this agreement
used to be based outside the institutional framework of the EU. Nowadays, it is inside the institutional
96

Ruling of the ECJ of 26 October 1989, ECR p. 3523.
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framework of the EU. The issues dealt with in the Schengen Agreement are, therefore, treated inside
the institutional framework of the EU, as Member States’ competences. Some of these issues are also
treated as Community competence.97 This is a very important point when it comes to external relations:
very often a specific problem of international politics can be treated in various ways. The fact of being
treated in one way or another has not only legal but also political consequences. The means taken and
the foreseeable results are different.
Experience has proven that one of the bigger mistakes of the usage of pillars is that it prevents
the same issue from being used in different ways. With the system of pillars in mind, people tend to ask
to which pillar a specific issue belongs. Since a good number of national administrations (and certain
services of the EU institutions) is organized by pillars instead of by issues, it is no surprise that this
question causes internal conflicts of power and jealousy. This is why it is almost evident for national
and Community civil servants that the political dialogue with third States belongs to the second pillar.
However, joint declarations, which create this political dialogue, do not limit their scope to questions
which, inside the Union, are treated within the framework of the CFSP.98 How can we then pretend to
avoid third States form raising questions which relate to EC exclusive competence in the framework of
this dialogue?
It should not be necessary to underline that the right approach is precisely the opposite of the
one that comes from asking the question to what pillar a certain issue belongs. The issue must be
analyzed from all possible angles in order to obtain the best solution. When various possible angles
give different ways of action, then this approach implies a difficulty, namely that it has to guarantee
coherence among the various ways of action. But politicians, senior civil servants, and jurists are paid
by taxpayers to resolve these kinds of difficulties and not to find the way (intellectually easy but the
wrong way) of putting each issue in only one of the potential ways of action.
97
98

Budge, I., Newton, K. et al. The Politics of the New Europe, Longman, 1997.
Hill, C. (ed.) The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, Routledge, 1996.
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B.1.- The European Community In The World Trade Organization: An Overview99

Let us start with a historical introduction of the WTO and its evolution. “At times it seemed doomed to
fail. But in the end, the Uruguay Round brought about the biggest reform of the world’s trading system
since GATT was created at the end of World War II. And yet, despite its troubled progress, the Uruguay
Round did see some early results. Within only two years, participants had agreed on a package of cuts in
import duties on tropical products — which are mainly exported by developing countries. They had also
revised the rules for settling disputes, with some measures implemented on the spot. And they called for
regular reports on GATT members’ trade policies, a move considered important for making trade regimes
transparent around the world.”100
There are three main purposes to the WTO: “the system’s overriding purpose is (i) to help trade
flow as freely as possible — so long as there are no undesirable side-effects. That partly means removing
obstacles. It also means ensuring that individuals, companies and governments know what the trade rules
are around the world, and giving them the confidence that there will be no sudden changes of policy. In
other words, the rules have to be “transparent” and predictable.”101 Because the agreements are drafted
and signed by the community of trading nations, often after considerable debate and controversy, one of
the WTO’s most important functions is (ii) to serve as a forum for trade negotiations. A third important
side to the WTO’s work is (iii) dispute settlement. It is a fact that in international trade negotiations there
99

Farrell, M. EU and WTO Regulatory Frameworks: Complementarity or Competition?, Kogan Page European Dossier
Series, 1999; Sack, “The EC’s Membership of International Organisations,” 32 Common Market Law Review 1227 (1995);
Reich, “Judge-made ‘Europe a la carte’: some remarks on recent conflicts between European and German constitutional law
provoked by the bananas litigation,” Europan Journal of International Law 103 (1996); Kuijper, P.J. “The Conclusion and
Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results by the EC,” 6 European Journal of International Law, 222 (1995); Everling,
“Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas judgments of the ECJ and national courts,” 33 Common Market Law Review 401
(1996); Cottier, T. & Schefer, “The Relationship Between World Trade Organization Law, National and Regional Law,” 1
Journal of International Economic Law 83 (1998); Pescatore, P. “Opinion 1/94 on ‘Conclusion’ of the WTO Agreement: is
there an escape from a programmed disaster? 36 Common Market Law Review 387 (1999); Princen, S. “EC Compliance with
WTO Law: The Interplay of Law and Politics,” 15 European Journal of International Law, 555-74 (2004).
100
See World Trade Organization, “Understanding the WTO: Basics. The Uruguay Round,” in
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited November 24, 2004).
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is unequal balance of power between smaller states and bigger states.102 “Trade relations often involve
conflicting interests. Contracts and agreements, including those painstakingly negotiated in the WTO
system, often need interpreting. The most harmonious way to settle these differences is through some
neutral procedure based on an agreed legal foundation. That is the purpose behind the dispute settlement
process written into the WTO Agreements.”103
“The WTO began life on 1 January 1995, but its trading system is half a century older. Since
1948, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had provided the rules for the system. Before
long it gave birth to an unofficial, de facto international organization, also known informally as GATT,
and over the years GATT evolved through several rounds of negotiations. The latest and largest round,
was the Uruguay Round which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and led to the WTO’s creation. Whereas GATT
had mainly dealt with trade in goods, the WTO and its Agreements now cover trade in services, and in
traded inventions, creations and designs (intellectual property).”104
As for the EC in the world trading system, it suffices to say that the EC was one of the signatories
to the Uruguay Round trade Agreement. Thus the EC was committed to make certain changes to the
policies operating in the EC. The text of the Uruguay Round Agreement, which in itself relates to
tightening up the rules on preferential trade agreements,105 offers more scope for conflict between the

101

Id.
This unequal balance of power is rectified in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, where both parties have equal
wait before the WTO Panel or Appellate Body and the party with stronger legal arguments (regardless of its negotiating
capacity) will win the case. For a detailed analysis on the matter, see Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons, "POWER
PLAYS & CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS: THE SELECTION OF DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES" (February 7, 2005).
International Legal Studies Program. International Legal Studies Working Papers Series. Paper 6.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/ils/wp/6 (last visited December 13, 2005).
103
World Trade Organization, “Understanding the WTO: Basics. What is the World Trade Organization?,” in
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited July 27, 2005).
104
Id.
105
Peers, S. “Banana Split: WTO Law and Preferential Agreements in the EC Legal Order,” 4 European Foreign Affairs
Review 195 (1994); Berkey, “The European Court of Justice and Direct Effect for the GATT: A Question Worht Revising,”
Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/98; Cremona, M. “EC External Commercial Policy after Amsterdam: Authority and
Interpretation within Interconnected Legal Orders,” in Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) Towards a Common Law of International Trade?
The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA, Oxford University Press, 2000; Griller, S. “Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the
Europena Union: Annotation to case C-149/96 Portugal v Council,” 3 Journal of International Economic Law 441 (2000); Van
den Broek, “Legal Persuation, Political Realism and Legitimacy: The European Court’s Recent Treatment of the Effect of the
WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order,” 4 Journal of International Economic Law 411 (2001); Eeckhout, P. “Judicial
Enforcement of WTO Law in the European Union – Some further reflections,” 5 Journal of International Economic Law 91
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WTO and the EC than do any other areas for the agreement bearing more directly on individual EC
policies, since it challenges the essence of the EU.106
When looking at the history of the EC external trade relations, one sees that the EC was not a
contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT). European countries such
as France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (but not Italy and Germany)
were founding contracting parties to GATT 1947. Subsequently, all EC Member States became full
members of such an institution. Over the years, the EC has become a full member and a contracting party
to the GATT/WTO. Accession protocols and trade agreements negotiated in the GATT framework
provided in their final provisions that the agreements were open for acceptance by contracting parties to
the GATT and by the EC. In addition, the substantive and procedural provisions of these agreements treat
the EC like a GATT contracting party.
Furthermore, since 1970, most agreements negotiated in the framework of GATT were accepted
by the EC alone, without acceptance by EC Member States. The only exceptions are two agreements at
the end of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations and the part of the Tariff Protocol relating
to European Coal and Steel Communty (ECSC) products.107 The EC exercised all rights and fulfilled
almost all obligations under GATT law in its own name like a GATT contracting party. Since the 1960s
all GATT contracting parties had accepted such exercise of rights and fulfillment of obligations by the EC
and had asserted their own GATT rights, even in dispute settlement proceedings relating to measures of

(2002); Eeckhout, P. “The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreements: Interconnecting Legal Systems,” 34 Common
Market Law Review 11 (1997); Denza, E. “The Community as a member of international organisations,” in Emiliou &
O’Keeffe, D. (eds.) The European Union and World Trade Law after the GATT Uruguay Round, Wiley, 1996; Cremona, M.
“Rhetoric and Reticence: EU External Commercial Policy in a Multilateral Context,” 38 Common Market Law Review 359
(2001); Snyder, F. “The Gatekeeprs: The European Courts and the WTO,” 40 Common Market Law Review 313 (2003).
106
Mary Farrell, EU AND WTO REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS: COMPLENTARITY OR COMPETITION?, Kogan
Page, 1999, p. 13.
107
Jaques H.J. Bourgeois, “The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers and on Government Procurement,” 19 CML
Rev 5, 22 (1982).
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individual EC Member States, almost always against the EC.108 The EC has replaced, with the consent of
other GATT contracting parties, its Member States as bearers of rights and obligations under the GATT.
Years later came the Agreement establishing the WTO, which recognizes the EC's membership
alongside the EU Member States. Under Article XI of the WTO Agreement, the EC and its Member
States became original members to the WTO of their own right.109 The EC is, without a doubt, a major
actor in the WTO, thanks to speaking with a single voice in the world trading system and in the WTO.
Facts speak for themselves: the EC of 15 represented the world’s largest trading bloc. In 2002, it
amounted to 37.3% of exports and 34.9% of imports in world merchandise trade. With respect to services
trade, the EC accounted for 43.2% of exports and 41.6% of imports. With the 2004 EU enlargement to 25
members, these figures have increased.110
In relation to voting rights inside the WTO – voting de facto never happens, since decisions in the
WTO are taken by consensus - the EC has a number of votes equal to the number of its Member States.111
The vote in areas of exclusive EC competence should not pose a problem in principle, whereas
difficulties may arise in areas of shared competence, especially in the absence of a common position
among the EU Member States together with the EC.

108

E.U. Petersmann, The EEC as a GATT Member –Legal Conflicts between GATT law and European Community Law, in
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 23 at 37-8 (M. Hilf, F.G. Jacobs & E.U. Petersmann, 1986).
109
Article XI of the WTO Agreement reads:
1.The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and the European Communities,
which accept this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements and for which Schedules of Concessions and
Commitments are annexed to GATT 1994 and for which Schedules of Specific Commitments are annexed to GATS shall
become original Members of the WTO.
2.The least-developed countries recognized as such by the United Nations will only be required to undertake commitments and
concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and
institutional capabilities.
110
See Cottier, T. & Oesch, M. International Trade Regulation. Law and Policy in the WTO, the European Union and
Switzerland. Cases, Materials and Comments, Cameron May, 2005, p. 235.
111
Article IX of the Agreement Establishing the WTO reads: “[W]here the European Communities exercise their right to vote,
they shall have a number of votes equal to the number of their member States which are Members of the WTO.”
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B.2.- The Diagnosis: Polycephalous (and Polyphonic?) Anatomy of the EC in the WTO

During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the EC was faced with the issue of the
scope of its authority under the EC Treaty in the field of international economic relations, particularly
with respect to trade in services112 and intellectual property rights.113 Negotiations were conducted
according to the normal procedures for GATT negotiations, albeit that the European Commission
negotiated on behalf of both the EC and its Member States.114 By creating the WTO as an international
organization, formal international consequences emerged in several respects: first of all, the fact that the
EC would become a member of the WTO; second of all, the EC would replace the EU Member States.
With regard to the latter point, two constraints of a political nature led the European Commission
not to stand up. The first constraint was the fact that the matter was discussed in a meeting of the EU
Council in November 1993, after the Maastricht Treaty had entered into effect with some difficulty and it
was thought wise not to push this issue at that stage. The second political constraint was that around this
time, the Council had not yet approved the Uruguay Round and Sir Leon Brittan thought it was preferable
not to put on the table another contentious issue. A result was the creation of Article XI of the Marrakesh
Agreement establishing the WTO, which states that the contracting parties to GATT 1947 and the
European Communities shall become original Members of the WTO.115
This dual membership of the EC and its Member States in the WTO (which creates a European
polycephalous approach to the WTO, i.e., 25 EU Member States and the European Communities, but not
polyphonic, since by the time they reach the WTO, European nations have found a common position to
speak with a single voice) may be an open door for abuse by other WTO members, and a handicap for
112

Mengozzi, P. “Trade in Services and Commercial Policy,” in Maresceau, M. (ed.) The European Community’s Commercial
Policy after 1992, pp. 223-47, (1993).
113
See Govaere, I. “Intellectual Property Protection and Commercial Policy,” in Maresceau, M. (ed.) The European
Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992, pp. 197-222, (1993); Demiray, P. “Intellectual Property and the External Power
of the European Community: The New Dimension,” 16 Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 187-239, (1994).
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P. van den Bossche, The European Community and the Uruguay Round Agreements, in IMPLEMENTING THE
URUGUAY ROUND, 23 at 56-7 (John H. Jackson & A. Sykes eds., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997).
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both the EC and its Member States.116 The fact that the EC Member States are WTO Members together
with the EC poses questions in relation to the position of the European Court of Justice to the WTO law.
As far as GATT 1947 was concerned, and as a result of the substitution of the EC for the Member States
in relation to commitments under GATT, the European Court of Justice would have the final word on the
interpretation of the GATT provisions, even in relation to the compatibility of Member States legislation
with GATT.117 However, this argument is no longer possible. In accordance with Article XI of the
Agreement establishing the WTO, both the EC and its Member States signed the Final Act.
The European Court of Justice has stated that the division of powers between the EC and its
Member States is a domestic question in which third parties have no need to intervene.118 In the minutes
of the Council meeting 7/8 March 1994, the Commission relied on this argument by saying that: “The
Final Act...and the Agreements thereto fall exclusively within the competence of the European
Community.”119 This argument does not allow the a sensu contrario inference that because the Member
States and the EC are formally WTO Members, it is irrelevant for the division of powers within the EC
legal system. On the contrary, the Agreement establishing the WTO and the agreements that form part of
it were approved by the Council on behalf of the EC expressly “as regards matters within its
competence.”120 Therefore, the need for a useful raison d’etre regarding the joint WTO membership of
the EC and the Member States is inevitable. It must have something to do with the division of powers
within the EC.
Certain trade agreements deal with matters in respect of which both the Community and its
Member States have competence. In these cases, the Court of Justice has stressed the duty of cooperation
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World Trade Organization, The Uruguay Round Results. The Legal Texts. (Geneva,1995), 6.
See generally Footer, M.E. “The EU and the WTO Global Trading System,” in Laurent, P.-H. & Maresceau, M. (eds.) The
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that exists between the Community and the Member States. I shall explore some of the problems that this
raises in practice.

III. Allocation of Competences between the EC and its Member States121

The issue of allocation of competences is an internal question for the EC.122 Leaving aside trade policy
(where the EC competences should be co-extensive with the WTO) and human rights (where the EC
should be given a general competence to adopt any measure which would increase the protection of
human rights within the sphere of application of EC law),123 the EC does not require any increase in its
substantive jurisdiction. The issue of allocation of competences is nevertheless a central concern and
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For a general overview on division of powers, see Simeon, R. Division of Powers and Public Policy, University of Toronto
Press, 1985.
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enflames high emotion among the general public,124 who fear the encroachment of supranational action
into areas of national heritage, power, and tradition.125 As suggested by Griller and Weidel, it is “another
manifestation of the struggle for power between the EC and its Member States.”126 Third States should
not mind, but practice demonstrates that they do: it is more difficult to speak with 26 voices (25 EU
Member States) than with one single voice (the EC). Additionally, as argued by Lukaschek and Weidel,
the “complicated system [of allocation of competences in the EU] is hardly ascertainable for the outside
world and might entail uncertainty and confusion for third countries about the identity and authority of
their negotiation partner.”127 Furthermore, being divided but united can give the EC an edge in
international bargaining. It is well-known that foreign trade policy and internal market policies require
close coordination. However, in the case of the EC, its nature makes this obviousness more challenging
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from a constitutional viewpoint.128 The separation of powers between the EC and its Member States, and
among the EU institutions, remains an unsolved issue in external trade regulation. Oftentimes, the EU’s
institutional and structural peculiarities are more of a constraint than a strategic advantage.

A.- Principal-Agent Theory and International Negotiations

The delegation of competences in the EC can be explained through the Principal-Agent theory. This
theory has only recently been applied to the context of negotiations.129 According to this theory, agency
costs can be due, inter alia, to information asymmetries. In other words, agents know more about their
duties than their principals do. In the context of negotiations, we would speak of agency costs because the
negotiator knows more than the principal about the constraints of external negotiations.130 Often, agency
costs also may occur because the agent’s interests may not be the same as those of her or his principals.
The challenge is to create institutional arrangements to minimize such agency costs.131
The question to analyze is who should speak for the EC in international trade negotiations.
According to Meunier and Nicolaïdis, the answer depends on the kind of relationship which has been
established between the spokesperson (European Commission) and its principals (EU Member States) as
well as on the phase at which the negotiation is.132 For the study of the allocation of EC competences in
trade policy-making, we will first make a brief note on the evolution of EC trade policy, and then apply
128

See Cremona, M. “The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and the External Relations Powers of
the European Community,” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, London, 1994, pp.
247-58.
129
Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU, 37/3 J.
COMMON MKT. STUDIES 477-501 (1999) and R. MNOOKIN, L. SUSSKIND & P. FOSTER (eds.) NEGOTIATING ON
BEHALF OF OTHERS, (London, Sage) (1999).
130
KALIPSO NICOLAÏDIS, Minimizing Agency Costs in Two-Level Games: The Controversies over Trade Authority in the
United States and the European Union, in R. MNOOKIN ET AL. NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS, (London,
Sage) (1999).
131
Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “EU Trade Policy: The Exclusive versus Shared Competence Debate,” in The State
of the European Union. Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, Vol. 5, 327 (Maria Green Cowles & Michael Smith eds., 2000),
at p. 328.
132
Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “EU Trade Policy: The Exclusive versus Shared Competence Debate,” in Maria
Green Cowles & Michael Smith (eds.) The State of the European Union. Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, Vol. 5, 327
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the principal-agent theory to understand the modes of control and the difference between exclusive and
shared competence in the EU.
There is no definition in the Treaties as to the areas that do lie within exclusive EC competence.
Defining the respective boundaries of competence is compounded by the fact that in a number of areas
the EC shares competence with its Member States. This difficulty of allocating competences is further
compounded by the presence of the implied powers provision which appears in Article 308 EC133 and the
liberal construction given to this by the European Court of Justice.134 Also when one considers the
division of competence between the EC and its Member States from an explicitly normative perspective,
the difficulty becomes even more marked.135 The criteria which ought to govern this issue,136 and its
institutional ramifications,137 are controversial.

B.- Legislative Competence

If it had been ratified by the EU Member States, the EU Constitutional Treaty would have brought
significant changes to the system of competences in the EU. It would have looked like a competence
catalogue, with the main advantage of being less vague than the current situation of not knowing clearly
who does what. This catalogue approach would have resembled the German Constitution system.138 The

(2000).
133
Former Article 235 EC. For an analysis of Article 308 EC, see Kramer, L. EC Treaty and Environmental Law, 2nd edition,
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1994; Close, G. “Harmonisation of Laws: Use or Abuse of the Powers under the EEC Treaty?” 3
European Law Review, pp. 461-81, (1978).
134
Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, (1991) 100 YALE LAW JOURNAL 2403, 2445-2446; Barav, A. “The
Division of External Relations Powers between the European Community and the Member States in the Case-Law of the Court
of Justice,” in Timmermans & Voelker (eds.) Division of Powers between the European Communities and their Member States
in the Field of External Relations, Deventer, Kluwer, 1981, pp. 29-64.
135
Paul Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union, EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 7, No. 2, June
2001, pp. 125-150, at 143.
136
Contrast F. Vibert, “How not to Write a Constitution-The Maastricht/Amsterdam Treaties” (1999) 10 CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY 152, with Weiler, J.H.H. “The Division of Competences in the European Union,” European
Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Working Paper, Political Series W 26, 1997.
137
J. Weiler, “European Constitutionalism: In Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order” (1996) XLIV
Political Studies 517.
138
In Germany, Article 73 of the Constitution enumerates the competences of the federal legislator. In addition, there is a
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EC enjoys only those powers conferred on it by the Treaties (Article 5 EC).139 Four types of legislative
competence140 are conferred upon the EC: exclusive, shared, complementary, and national competence.
Since the EC Treaty does not provide a definition, these may be defined as follows:

B.1.- Exclusive EC Competence

The EC enjoys exclusive competence when it alone is able to adopt rules in an area. Any intervention by
the Member States is excluded unless it has the authorization of the EU institutions or where there is a
lacuna needing to be filled. The areas where the EC has exclusive competence are the following: common
commercial policy (to the extent existing prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice); living marine
resources in the zones covered by the Treaty; establishment of the common customs tariff;141 monetary
policy for the twelve Member States in the euro area;142 in addition, those areas which become areas of

catalogue of concurring competences and frame competences. Furthermore, there is a structural principle laid down in Article
72 of the Constitution. Concurring competences in the German model means that the Laender have competence so long as the
federal legislator has not taken action. The catalogue of concurring competences is combined with a structural principle: the
federal power is only allowed to take action in order to enhance economic and legal unity, as well as uniformity of social
conditions (Article 72 of the German Constitution). The catalogue of concurring competences has to be read in conjunction
with the rule that federal law overrules state law.
139
Article 5 EC reads:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it
therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle
of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
140
Legislative competence refers to the adoption of legislative texts in the literal sense or the creation of legal obligations by
the EU institutions (“secondary legislation”) based directly on the Treaties of the European Communities (“primary
legislation”).
141
Usher, J. “Consequences of the Customs Union,” in Emiliou & O’Keeffe, D. The European Union and World Trade Law
after the GATT Uruguay Round, Wiley, 1996; Vermulst & Waer, “EC Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments?” 3
Journal of World Trade 55 (1990); Vander Schueren, “Tariff Classification: An Instrument of EC Trade Policy,” 2 European
Foreign Affairs Review 255 (1997).
142
Zilioli, C. & Selmayr, M. “The External Relations of the Euro Area: Legal Aspects,” 36 Common Market Law Review, 289
(1999); Dutheil de la Rochere, J. “Constitutional Aspects and External Representation,” 19 Yearbook of European Law, 441
(1999-2000); Hermann, C.W. “Monetary Sovereignty over the Euro and External Relations of the Euro Area: Competences,
Procedures and Practice,” 7 European Foreign Affairs Review, 18 (2002).
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exclusive competence because the EC legislates extensively in the area concerned on the basis of its
shared competence.143
Although the EC competence is in principle allocated to it explicitly by the Treaties, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) has taken the view that in some cases competence flows implicitly from the EC
Treaty texts or their general structure.144 These tend to be cases in which competence is necessary to
implement aims set by the Treaties, especially in the field of external relations.145 The EC only has the
powers accorded to it under the Treaties.146 All other powers thus reside with the Member States. A
clause to this effect, redolent of that to be found in the U.S. Constitution,147 could then be included within
a European Constitution. This could undoubtedly be done. It would however only serve to mask, or push
further back, the issues that really serve to define the powers of the EU and the Member States.148
The idea of giving certain competences exclusively to the EC was a creation of the ECJ’s caselaw.149 The Court has specified that EU Member States were no longer allowed to adopt legislative
measures or to independently conclude treaties with third countries since the EC power was exclusive.
However, in other cases, the ECJ held that certain competences were not exclusive EC competences,
which means that it did not prevent EU Member States from acting.150 This said, it is fair to acknowledge

143

The European Convention, The Secretariat, Discussion Paper: “Delimitation of Competence between the European Union
and the Member States. –Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored, CON 47/02, kin/MM/ac, p. 6.
144
Bengoetxea, J. The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European Jurisprudence, Oxford
University Press, 1993.
145
The European Convention, The Secretariat, Discussion Paper: “Delimitation of Competence between the European Union
and the Member States. –Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored,” CON 47/02, kin/MM/ac, p. 9.
146
A. Dashwood, The Limits of European Community Powers (Cambridge Centre for European Legal Studies, 1995).
147
United States Constitution, 10th Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
148
Paul Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union, EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 7, No. 2, June
2001, pp. 125-150, at 143.
149
Among the authors that have studied this issue are: Pescatore, P. “External Relations in the Case Law of the ECJ,” 16
Common Market Law Review, p. 615, 1979; Groux, J. “Le Parallelisme des Competences Internes et Externes de la CE,”
Cahiers de Droit Europeen, p. 1, 1978; Kovar, “Contribution de la Cour de Justice au developpement de la condition
internationale de la Communaute europeenne,” Cahiers de Droit Europeen, p. 527, 1978; Boulois, J. “La Jurisprudence de la
Cour de Justice des Communautes europeennes relative aux relations exterieures des Communautes,” 160 Hague Recueil, pp.
333-93, 1978 II.
150
See in this debate Emiliou, “The Death of Exclusive Competence?” 21 European Law Review, 294 (1996); Weiler, J.H.H.
“The External Legal Relations of non-unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal Principle,” in Weiler, J.H.H. The Constitution of
Europe: Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?,” Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 130-87; O’Keeffe, D. “Community
and Member State Competence in External Relations Agreements of the EU,” 4 European Foreign Affairs Review, 7 (1994);
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that the list of exclusive EC competence is very limited.151 In any case, the debate in the legal literature
over the meaning of exclusive EC competence seems to be inconclusive to date.152
Since the then European Economic Community (EEC) founding fathers153 chose a customs union
as the way to proceed towards a unified Europe,154 a common trade policy vis-à-vis the rest of the world
was inevitable.155 The Community has retained exclusive competence in almost all issues in this field,
and the European Commission acts on behalf of the EC with a qualified majority vote from the Council.
However, on some trade issues, Member States have competence (despite the “exclusive” EC competence
in commercial policy). For example, in the concluding phases of the Uruguay Round (General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, of October 30, 1947),156 the full stature of the EC in global trade affairs was
displayed for the first time as the world spotlight fell on the EC and the U.S. hammering out the final
deal.157
It was at that moment that an internal debate arose between the EU Member States and the
European Commission about the coverage of the existing commercial policy provisions of Article 133
EC158 in the areas of intellectual property and services. The Commission negotiated the Uruguay Round
and the competence issue between the EC and its Member States had been bracketed. As we will see later

Timmermans, “Organizing Joint Participation of EC and Member States,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General
Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 239 ff; Hyett, S. “The duty of cooperation: A flexible concept,” in
Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 248 ff; Govare,
Capiau & Vermeersch, “In-Between Seats: The Participation of the EU in International Organisations,” 9 European Foreign
Affairs Review, 155 (2004).
151
Pescatore, P. “Les Relations Exterieures des Communautes Europeennes,” 103 Recueil des Cours, pp. 1-244, (1961-II).
152
For a larger debate on the issue, see G. de Burca, “Reappraising subsidiarity’s significance after Amsterdam,” Harvard
Jean Monnet Working Paper 7/1999, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
153
In the years following World War II, people like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman dreamed of uniting the peoples of
Europe in lasting peace and friendship. Over the following fifty years, as the EU was built, their dream became reality. That is
why they are called the “founding fathers” of the European Union.
154
A customs union, or CU, can be defined as full trade liberalization between two countries/regions, plus a single external
tariff. The customs union is one of the key components of the European Union, whereby non-EU countries exporting products
to the EU are charged the same tariff regardless of which EU country is importing the goods. This made life simpler for traders
and cut down their paperwork. The EU also concluded a customs union with Turkey in 1995, aiming at the free circulation of
manufactured goods between the EU and Turkey.
155
NEIL MACCORMICK, BEYOND THE SOVEREIGN STATE, 56 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1993).
156
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 187.
157
Rosas, A. “The External Relations of the European Union: Problems and Challenges” in The Forum for US-EU LegalEconomic Affairs, The Mentor Group, 1998, pp.59-71.
158
TEC Article 133, as amended by the TEU.
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in greater detail, when the European Court of Justice was consulted, it stated in Opinion 1/94 that only
certain aspects of the two sectors could be considered as falling under Article 133 EC, and thereby under
the EC’s exclusive competence.159 During the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that produced the
Treaty of Amsterdam,160 the Commission, reacting against Opinion 1/94, made a proposal to enlarge the
scope of the relevant treaty provisions to explicitly include services and intellectual property.161 The
Member States refused because they still wanted their participation in international trade agreements.162
In this respect, one can argue that Opinion 1/94 represents a step backwards in what had been, until then,
the successful development of the EC common commercial policy.
The Community as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. According to Mavroidis, even
Germany, the EC’s leading economy, has much more weight as part of the EC than it would by itself in
international economic relations.163 The general assumption seems to be that the EC combined as a single
voice would be more powerful than divided into 26 voices164 (one from the European Commission acting
on behalf of the EU institutions and 25 other voices from each of the EU Member States).165 A sensu
contrario, the old and successful military strategy “divide and conquer”166 should be a sign for the EU to
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Opinion 1/94, 1994 E.C.R. I-5267, I-5401; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 205, 316.
The Treaty of Amsterdam is the result of the Intergovernmental Conference launched at the Turin European Council on 29
March 1996. It was adopted at the Amsterdam European Council on 16 and 17 June 1997 and signed on 2 October 1997 by the
Foreign Ministers of the then fifteen EU Member States. It entered into force on 1 May 1999 (the first day of the second month
following ratification by the last Member State) after ratification by all the Member States in accordance with their respective
constitutional requirements.
161
Alan Dashwood, External Relations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1019 (1998).
162
For a general discussion on this issue, see Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: An
Echternach Procession, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. (1995).
163
Mavroidis, P. “Lexcalibur: The House that Joe Built”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 38, 2000, Number 3,
at p. 674.
164
President Lincoln’s injunction “United we stand, divided we fall” can be extrapolated for the case of the EC's external trade
relations to illustrate my argument. Abraham Lincoln used this idea in a speech before the American Civil War, when he
referred to a Biblical statement that a house divided against itself cannot stand. Pascal Lamy often used this injuction when he
was EU trade commissioner to justify a larger delegation of trade competence by the EU Member States to the EU
supranational level. It implies that institutional rules, which allow the EU Member States to make decisions more quickly and
the Commission to represent Member States internationally in a united manner, give the collective entity an edge ini
international bargaining.
165
The same argument is expressed by Leivo in Leivo, K. “The Need for an Exclusive External Competence of the European
Community with Regard to International Trade in Services,’ Working Papers, College of Europe, European University Press,
Brussels, 1996.
166
Derived from the Latin saying divide et impera, it can mean in politics a strategy to gain or maintain power by breaking up
larger concentrations of power into chunks that individually have less power than the one implementing the strategy. In reality,
it often refers to a strategy where small power groups are prevented from linking up and becoming more powerful, since it is
160
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avoid disunity. The tendency in trade policy seems to be toward exclusive EC (“EU” after the
Constitutional Treaty) competence with the changes brought by the EU Constitutional Treaty.
One important mechanism for coordinating a single voice is the creation of European “policy
units.”167 Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, initiated this idea. Academics from various
European countries including Germany, France and Spain have been asked to participate in this initiative.
This shows that Britain is still committed to Europe. Authors such as Peter Mandelson and Bodo
Hombach believe that collaboration will increase the likelihood of a European federal superstate. In the
same line, Mark Leonard believes that the EU needs to have a single debate in the European Union rather
than 25 separate national debates, one for each Member State.
That said, the progressive centralization of European Community trade policy and its generally effective
pursuit in international negotiations has not disguised vigorous differences of policy and priorities among
the Member States. These differences do not make the European Community an easy partner in
negotiations.168

B.2.- Shared Competence

Shared competence covers areas where Member States may legislate until such time and insofar as the EC
has not yet exercised its powers by adopting rules. Once the EC has legislated in such an area, Member
States may no longer legislate in the field covered by this legislation, except to the extent necessary to
implement it, and the legislative rules adopted have priority over those of the Member States. EC
competence thus becomes exclusive through its exercise.169 With respect to shared competence, Meny

difficult to break up existing power structures. Effective use of this technique allows those with little real power to control
those who collectively have a lot of power (or would have much power, if they could get united).
167
See “London is Capital of Third Way,” in The Independent, on Sunday, 10 January 1999, p. 2.
168
See Johnson, M. The European Community Trade Policy and the Article 113 Committee, London, Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1998.
169
The European Convention, The Secretariat, Discussion Paper: “Delimitation of Competence between the European Union
and the Member States. –Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored,” CON 47/02, kin/MM/ac, p. 7.
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argues that “since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the number of shared compentencies –often
benefiting the Union- has increased considerably, to the point that this is often seen as a creeping
expropriation of the Member States’ powers.”170
The EC’s legislative action in those areas is subject to compliance with the principles of
subsidiarity171 and proportionality.172 Most EC powers fall within this category:173 citizenship of the EU;
agriculture and fisheries (except for the part under exclusive EC competence); the four freedoms (free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital);174 visas, asylum and immigration;175 transport;176
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Y. Meny, ‘The External and Internal Borders of the Great Europe,’ in THE INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATOR, 2/2002,
pp. 19-25, at. 22.
171
The principle of subsidiarity regulates the exercise of powers. It is intended to determine whether, in an area where there is
shared competence, the EC can take action or should leave the matter to the Member States. The principle of subsidiarity hence
means that EC decisions must be taken as closely as possible to the citizen, and argues, as can be seen in Article 5 EC, that the
EC should take action only if, and insofar as, the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore be better achieved at the EC level. In other words, the EC does not take action (except on
matters for which it alone is responsible), unless EC action is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local
level. The subsidiarity principle hence limits Community interventions. The implementation of this principle is subject to ex
ante control through the assent procedure of national parliaments, but also ex post through the judicial remedy (paragraph 7 of
the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality). A protocol annexed to the Treaty of
Amsterdam sets the conditions and application criteria of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. This protocol
specially provides for:
the obligation to justify and legislative proposal by proving its compliance with the subsidiary principles;
guidelines;
the obligation to present an annual report; and
a procedure of verification by the Council and European Parliament.
In order to take better account of the subsidiarity principle, the Commission set out several rules it its annual reports “To Better
Legislate” (1997-1999), in particular regarding consultation of interested parties, improvement in the drafting quality of texts,
and simplification of existing legislation. The report “To Better Legislate 2000” introduced the implementation of principles
on subsidiarity.
172
The principle of proportionality implies that any action by the EC should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objectives of the EC Treaty. It should not be confused with the principles of subsidiarity, which enables the resolution of the
considered action’s level (national of Community level), while the principle of proportionality concerns the size of the action.
This principle has appeared in Court decisions since 1956, for example Coal Federation of Belgium –judgment of November
26, 1956.
173
The extent of the powers conferred on the EC by the relevant chapters of the EC Treaty varies depending on the area.
174
For further analysis, see Eeckhout, P. “Constitutional Concepts for Free Trade in Services,” in de Burca, G. & Scott, J.
(eds.) The EU and the WTO-Legal and Constitutional Issues, Hart, 2001.
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Peers, S. “The Visa Regulation: Free Movement Blocked Indefinitely?” European Law Review 150 (1996); Castro
Oliveira, “Immigrants from Third Countries under EC External Agreements: The Need for Improvement,” 4 European
Foreign Affairs Review 215 (1994); Peers, S. “Buildinig Fortress Europe: The Development of EU Migration Law,” 35
Common Market Law Review 1235 (1998); Martin & Guild (eds.) Free Movement of Persons in the EU, Butterworths, 1996;
Guild (ed.) The Legal Framework and Social Consequences of Free Movement of Persons in the EU (Part II), Kluwer, 1999;
Hailbronner, Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy of the European Union, Kluwer, 2000; Hedemann-Robinson, “An
Overview of Recent Legal Developments at Community Level in Relation to Third Country Nationals Resident Within the
European Union, with Particular Reference to the Case Law of the ECJ,” 38 Common Market Law Review 525 (2001); Peers,
S. “Towards Equality: Actual and Potential Right of Third Country Nationals in the EU,” 33 Common Market Law Review 7
(1996); Eisl, “Relations with the Central and Eastern Countries in Justice and Home Affairs: Deficits and Options,” European
Foreign Affairs Review 351 (1997); Hakura, “External EU Immigration Policy: The Need to Move Beyond Orthodoxy,” 3
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competition; taxation; social policy; the environment;177 consumer protection; trans-European networks
(interoperability and standards); economic and social cohesion; energy, civil protection and tourism.178
Regarding the Treaty on European Union, its Title V which deals with the common foreign and
security policy, with the exception of defense, also falls within this category.179 Lastly, Title VI of the
TEU (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) falls within this category as well, apart from the
provisions relating to the setting up of joint bodies.
In fact, authors such as Alfonso Mattera180 claim that there is only one type of competence, that of
shared competence, with different degrees of interference, depending on the policy. In this sense, Member
States might interfere actively in cultural policy, but only minimally in common commercial policy.181
The fundamental principles of democratic and political accountability cannot be achieved if the
constitutional order is fragmented and requires the use of metaphors to describe the interrelations of its

European Foreign Affairs Review 115 (1998); Petrov, “Rights of Third Country/Newly Independent States’ Nationals to
Pursue Economic Activity in the EU,” 4 European Foreign Affairs Review 235 (1999); Meloni, Visa Policy within the
European Union Structure, Springer, 2005; Guild, Immigration Law in the European Community, Kluwer, 2001; Peers, S.
“Implementing Equality? The Directive on long-term resident nationals,” European Law Review 437 (2004); Monar, J.
“Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: Reform at the Price of Fragmentation,” 23 European Law Review 320
(1998); Hailbronner, “European Immigration and Asylum Law under the Amsterdam Treaty,” 35 Common Market Law
Review 1047 (1998); O’Keeffe, D. “Can the Leopard Change its Spots? Visas, Immigration and Asylum following
Amsterdam,” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, (eds.) Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, Hart, 1999; Kuijper, P.J. “Some Legal
Problems Associated with the Communitarization of Policy of Visas, Asylum and Immigration under the Amsterdam Treaty
and Incorporation of the Schengen Acquis,” 37 Common Market Law Review 345 (2000); Phuong, “Enlarging Fortress Europe:
EU Accession, Asylum and Immigration in Candidate Countries,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 641 (2003);
Lambert, “The EU Asylum Qualification Directive, its Impact on the Jurisprudence of the UK and International Law,”
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 161 (2006); Guild, The Developing Immigration and Asylum Policies of the
European Union, 1996; Guild & Harlow (eds.) Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law, Hart,
2001; Boccardi, Europe and Refugees: Towards an EU Asylum Policy, Kluwer, 2002.
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Balfour, J. “Freedom to Provide Air Transport Services in the EEC,” 14 European Law Review, pp. 30-46, (1989); Close,
G. “External Relations in the Air Transport Sector: Air Transport Policy in the Common Commercial Policy?,” 27 Common
Market Law Review, pp. 108-27, (1990); Haanappel, P. “The External Aviation Relations of the European Economic
Community and of EEC Member States into the Twenty-First Century,” 14 Air Law, pp. 122-46, (1989).
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For a further analysis of external competence in environmental matters, see Jans, J.H. European Environmental Law, (2nd
edition, Europa Law Publishing, 2000), chapter 2.
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The EC Treaty does not contain a specific legal basis covering the fields of energy, civil protection and tourism. The EC
can therefore act only on the basis of Article 308 EC.
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College of Europe, Brugges.
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parts.182 Could one then argue that non-exclusive EC competence (i.e., shared competence) is translated
as de iure and de facto EC fragmentation? From a national perspective, Schuppert argues that unity of
administration is based on the unity of democratic origin of all sovereign power.183 Hesse claims that all
public authority originates with the people. With the enactment, continuation, and development of the
constitution, this authority is passed on to the various organs within the constitutional framework. All
bodies exercising sovereign power continue to be dependent on the unifying origin of that power.184 Can
these arguments be made from a supranational perspective? Would they be valid for the purposes of the
EC’s common commercial policy?
Shared competence between the EC and its Member States implies the fragmentation of unity in
the international representation of the European Community and translates into less power for the EC in
the international arena. On the other hand, EC exclusive competence facilitates international negotiations,
since the European Commission is the only competent actor in any given matter. Experience has shown
that mixed agreements can and do cause delays, which can actually worsen negotiating situations.185
However, at present the implementation and conclusion of mixed trade agreements is done at the national
level. Therefore, a system in which both the EC and its Member States are involved seems to be an
optimal situation in terms of efficiency.
With the new balance between Brussels and national institutions and, to some extent, between
national institutions and regional and local authorities, some kind of rebellion has started in Europe. As
Meny rightly points out, “any attribution of powers is arbitrary and therefore political; in fact, even if
some criteria of efficiency and rationality are taken into account, it is mainly on the basis of political

182
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criteria that powers are distributed among the various decision-making […] levels.”186 Even if there are
expectations for eliminating overlap in competences between the EC and its Member States, one should
not forget that economic and social reality is so complex that the hope of reaching a clear separation of
powers is an illusion.187 It is therefore important to establish the methods and instruments for exercising
those competences. In all existing constitutional texts, even in those based on a catalogue of powers, gray
areas exist and constitutional courts are called to resolve questions relating to the resultant conflicts of
competence.188
Trade is one of the areas where EU Member States have politically agreed to delegate
representation. However, EU Member States have started to question the transfer of sovereignty to the EC
level, especially on issues such as services, investment, and intellectual property rights.189 The famous
Opinion 1/94190 of the ECJ clearly acknowledged that the EC and the EU Member States actually share
competence in these areas. A few years later, the Amsterdam Treaty reinforced restrictions to transfers of
sovereignty to the EC level in the area of trade by allowing EU Member States to decide what
competence to delegate on a case-by-case basis at the end of a negotiation.
As mentioned before, in the field of external trade relations of the European Community, there are
many examples where the Community’s and the Member States’ competence is shared; for instance, in
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Meny, Y. ‘The External and Internal Borders of the Great Europe,’ in THE INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATOR, 2/2002,
pp. 19-25, at. 22
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the Food and Agriculture Organization, where Case 25/94,191 Commission v Council, can be used as
evidence. In this case, the ECJ made its most significant input on the duty of cooperation.192 Competences
in the EC are joint because Member States prefer not to allow Community competence and, instead,
preserve their national competence.193 This approach, which became apparent in the Court’s Opinion 2/91
on the International Labor Organization (ILO),194 weakens the constitutional position of the Community
in the field of external relations. On the other hand, shared competence increases the leverage of the most
protectionist EU countries. Shared competence also would imply a strong voice if the polyphonic “choir”
(all the EU Member States and the Commission) sings. This will give the choir strength and
independence.
With respect to shared competence, the second subparagraph of paragraph 6 of Article 133 of the
Nice Treaty removes certain sectors from the scope of the first subparagraph of paragraph 5 of Article
133 of the Nice Treaty.195 The areas included are cultural and audiovisual services, educational services,
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For a legal analysis of Case 25/94, see Heliskoski, J. “The Internal Struggle for International Presence: The Exercise of
Voting Rights Within the FAO,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet &
Maxwell, 2000, pp. 79-99.
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COMMON MKT. L. REV., 386 (1995).
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Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. I-1061.
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Article 133 EC reads:
192

1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common commercial policy.
3. Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need to be negotiated, the Commission shall
make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Council
and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the agreements negotiated are compatible with internal Community
policies and rules.
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist
the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. The Commission shall
report regularly to the special committee on the progress of negotiations.
The relevant provisions of Article 300 shall apply.
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act by a qualified majority.
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall also apply to the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in services and the
commercial aspects of intellectual property, in so far as those agreements are not covered by the said paragraphs and without
prejudice to paragraph 6.
By way of derogation from paragraph 4, the Council shall act unanimously when negotiating and concluding an agreement in
one of the fields referred to in the first subparagraph, where that agreement includes provisions for which unanimity is required
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and social and human health services. According to Krenzler and Pitschas, “as the Community may not
adopt any measures under Articles 150 IV, 151 IV c) and 152 EC that result in the harmonization of
national laws or regulations in these services sectors, the Community does not have exclusive
competence.”196 This means that the competence is shared between the EC and its Member States. The
second subparagraph of paragraph 6 of Article 133 of the Nice Treaty refers to it by using the locution
“shared competence.” This is the first time that this locution appears in the Treaty text. However, the
concept of shared competence has existed for a very long time. Agreements in these services sectors must
be concluded as mixed agreements, and only enter into force after ratification by all EU national
parliaments.197 The legal ramification of shared competence explains the efforts made by the Commission
and scholars to bring about exclusive EC competence to avoid the potential risk of Europaralysis. Yet,
many trade agreements are signed as mixed agreements.
In mixed agreements, if there is more than one negotiator other than the European Commission,
then the EC’s negotiating position is being weakened, though not necessarily that of the Member

for the adoption of internal rules or where it relates to a field in which the Community has not yet exercised the powers
conferred upon it by this Treaty by adopting internal rules.
The Council shall act unanimously with respect to the negotiation and conclusion of a horizontal agreement insofar as it also
concerns the preceding subparagraph or the second subparagraph of paragraph 6.
This paragraph shall not affect the right of the Member States to maintain and conclude agreements with third countries or
international organisations in so far as such agreements comply with Community law and other relevant international
agreements.
6. An agreement may not be concluded by the Council if it includes provisions which would go beyond the Community's
internal powers, in particular by leading to harmonisation of the laws or regulations of the Member States in an area for which
this Treaty rules out such harmonisation.
In this regard, by way of derogation from the first subparagraph of paragraph 5, agreements relating to trade in cultural and
audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services, shall fall within the shared competence of the
Community and its Member States. Consequently, in addition to a Community decision taken in accordance with the relevant
provisions of Article 300, the negotiation of such agreements shall require the common accord of the Member States.
Agreements thus negotiated shall be concluded jointly by the Community and the Member States.
The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport shall continue to be governed by the
provisions of Title V and Article 300.
7. Without prejudice to the first subparagraph of paragraph 6, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may extend the application of paragraphs 1 to 4 to international
negotiations and agreements on intellectual property in so far as they are not covered by paragraph 5.
196
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Affairs Review 6, 2001, pp. 291-313, at 309.
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States.198 This is because as long as the external competence has not become exclusively EC competence,
Member States, even acting collectively, remain free to enter into multilateral treaty relations.199 The
tensions created by the mixture of competences between the EC and its Member States are seen as an
obstacle to the achievement of Community interests as a whole, and are a problem for Europe’s trade
partners. Even though Article 133 EC gives exclusive competence in commercial policy to the EC, the
treaty also limits this competence.200
According to Jean Groux, for third States it is preferable to have a mixed procedure because they
are not familiar with dealing with the European Community, the competences and responsibilities of
which they know but imperfectly.201 For example, in the case of a third party like the U.S., if it has
complete information about the Member States’ position, then it is easier to accept that the EC act with a
single voice. In this sense, there are, at least, three variables to take into consideration:
1) secrecy;
2) physical difficulty for a third party to obtain information; and
3) institutional processes.
In the case of the first variable, this would mean that having a single representation of the EC in
international agreements obscures information about the Member States’ actual position. Therefore, there
is less transparency and, consequently, it might be more difficult to reach an agreement. With regard to
the second variable, it is very much linked to the first one in the sense that having a single voice in the EC
makes it harder to negotiate for a third party, since there is less transparency. As for institutional
processes, it refers to the fact that sometimes exclusive EC competence involves various DirectoratesGeneral of the European Commission.
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Information gathered from an interview with John Richardson in June 2001, Head of the Delegation of the European
Commission to the UN.
199
Even if de iure this is a plausible situation, de facto it has never happened.
200
Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992).
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However, what has been the attitude of third States when the European Community has entirely
taken over the responsibilities of the Member States in certain areas? It is only in the last case that third
States overtly put pressure on the Community to use the mixed negotiation technique. Here one may cite
the example of the negotiations begun in 1975 between the EEC and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA, or commonly known as Comecon)202 with a view to normalizing the relations of the
Community with the East European countries. These countries, which were in fact somewhat reluctant to
envisage an official recognition of the Community, had much difficulty in accepting the decision of the
Council of the Communities that the negotiations would be conducted by the Commission alone, and they
tried in vain to ensure the participation also of the Member States.203 As a matter of fact, the EC was not
recognized as an international organization by Comecon until 1988.204 This position adopted by Comecon
was rectified shortly before Comecon was dissolved.
That said, and knowing that the presumption in the EC is to have collective action, is there really a
“common” European interest? If so, is this interest so great as to assume that in certain circumstances
Member States will act with a single voice? Do Members States have enough proximity in their national
interests to act with one voice in the international sphere?

B.3.- Complementary Competence

It covers areas where EC competence is limited to supplementing or supporting Member States’ action, or
coordinating Member States’ action. The power to adopt legislative rules in these areas remains part of
202

Comecon was an economic organization from 1949 to 1991, linking the USSR with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, East Germany (1950–1990), Mongolia (from 1962), Cuba (from 1972), and Vietnam (from 1978), with
Yugoslavia as an associated member. Albania also belonged between 1949 and 1961. Its establishment was prompted by the
Marshall Plan. Comecon was formally disbanded in June 1991. It was agreed in 1987 that official relations should be
established with the European Community, and a free-market approach to trading was adopted in 1990. In January 1991 it was
agreed
that
Comecon
should
be
effectively
disbanded.
See
http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0006083.html (last visited June 30, 2005).
203
O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983.
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the Member States and intervention by the EC cannot have the effect of excluding intervention by the
Member States.205
The fields where the Member States have exclusive competence to legislate, and the EC has no
power to interfere upon their work are: economic policy; employment; customs cooperation; education,
vocational training and youth; culture; public health; trans-European networks (excluding the
interoperability of networks and technical standards); industry; research and technological development,
defence policy (Title V of the TEU),206 and development cooperation.207

B.4.- Exclusive EU Member States’ Competence
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This covers areas not referred to in the EC Treaty and therefore not within the competence of the EC. It
remains within the Member States’ areas, where the Treaties expressly exclude EC competence, or
expressly recognize the competence of Member States, as well as areas where the EC Treaty forbids the
EC to legislate.208
The areas within the EU Member States’ competence are: 1) those that are not within the EC
competence and therefore remain Member States’ competence, such as the internal organization of States,
national identity, national military structure inter alia; 2) areas expressly reserved to the Member States
by the EC Treaty,209 such as public order and public security, the enforcement of criminal law and the
administration of justice,210 the right to strike and the right of association, the supply of health services
and medical care, rules dealing with the system of property ownership; 3) areas where the EC Treaty
forbids the EC to legislate: education, vocational training, culture, employment and health.211
The hypothesis of exclusive EU Member States’ competence is somehow difficult to conceive in
the framework of the EC external trade relations, at least from a conceptual viewpoint. The fact that we
are dealing with the EC external trade relations explicitly implies the participation and inclusion of a
supranational entity, i.e., the EC. Therefore, this hypothesis has very little or no foundation at all on
which to base the question whether there will be more legal coherence by having exclusive EC
competence on all issues of EC trade policy. One could foresee, though, a situation where there is no
polyphonic choir among the EU Member States. They would therefore be in danger of losing their
sovereignty but they would still keep their independence.

Benevolent Identity?” 8 European Foreign Affairs Review 395 (2003).
208
In some cases, the EC Treaty limits the exercise of Member States’ competence by imposing obligations upon them. For
example, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality or the prohibition on granting State aids incompatible with
the common market.
209
The EC Treaty grants Member States various derogations from the four freedoms of movement on grounds of public order,
public safety or other considerations of general interest.
210
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(2002).
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C.- Non-legislative or Executive Competence

Competence to implement and apply legislation in accordance with their respective constitutional rules
rests with the Member States,212 subject to monitoring by the Commission, national courts and the ECJ.213
The EC exercises such competence in a subsidiarity capacity only.214

C.1.- Implementation of Legislative Acts215

This concerns the drafting of normative rules. Its purpose is to apply legislative acts. It will only be
necessary for the EC to adopt regulations if the aims of the planned action cannot be adequately achieved
by the MS. Should it be the case for the EC to adopt regulations, then the power of implementation by the
EC of its legislative acts is conferred on the Commission by the European Parliament and the Council in
the case of codecision and by the Council in other cases.216

C.2.- Administrative, Material or Budgetary Implementation of Community Acts

This concerns administrative implementing measures, sanctions to ensure compliance with EC law, etc.
The adoption of such measures is a matter for EU Member States, which determine the proper bodies,
procedures and conditions for ensuring the correct implementation of EC law. The EC may nevertheless
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intervene in the implementation of EC acts where the Treaty or the EC legislator give the EC the power to
do so.

D.- Criteria for Evaluating the Distribution of Powers and its Compliance

Delimitation of competences is absolutely necessary in a federal217 or a quasi federal set-up nature, which
I think is the case of the EU, depending on what policy we are analyzing – and that is certainly the case of
trade policy - for the simple reason that if there were no such delimitation, there would be chaos within
the system, with no clarity among citizens as to who does what. That said, I do not think that the rationale
of traditional States can be applied directly to the Union, as the Union is itself a Union of sovereign
States. A clear example of this is the fact that defence and foreign policy have not been clearly stated by
the EU Constitutional Treaty to be within the Union’s exclusive competence, which would be necessary
in the traditional federal set-up.
Below is an analysis of the four main and non-exhaustive criteria for evaluating the distribution of
powers: 1) efficiency; 2) transparency and clarity; 3) coherence/consistency; and 4) accountability.

1.- Efficiency in international trade negotiations

One criterion is that of effective functioning. Power should be exercised by an authority at a level where
it can be exercised most effectively. Since the distribution of powers is vague, it leaves immense scope

217

Broadly speaking, European federalism means any system of government where several states form a unity and yet remain
independent in their internal affairs. People who are in favor of this system are often called “federalists.” A number of
countries around the world –such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States– have federal models of
government, in which some matters (such as foreign policy) are decided at the federal level, while others are decided by the
individual states. However, the model differs from one country to another. The European Union is not based on any of these
models: it is not a federation but a unique form of union in which the Member States remain independent and sovereign
nations while pooling their sovereignty in many areas of common interest. This gives them a collective strength and influence
on the world stage that none of them could have on their own. Part of the debate about the future of Europe is the question of
whether the EU should or should not become more 'federal.'
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for disputes between the Union and its Member States, which cannot but hamper an efficient Union. The
EC has become a more important and difficult trading partner. It started with six homogeneous Member
States, and then was enlarged to 9, 10, 12, 15, and finally 25 countries. Soon it is expected to have 27+
Member States. When demands are presented in the WTO by the EC as a common front, these inevitably
carry more weight within the WTO than would be the case if an individual country were making the
case.218 As an example we have the EC’s mandate for the Services Agreement negotiations prepared for
the Seattle Ministerial Conference in October 1999. This mandate included various cultural exceptions for
individual EU Member States, which originated from the French delegation. The French had concerns
about their audio-visual services area. They wanted the EC to defend their national interests in the WTO.
The reverse situation could also happen: demands from small EU Member States without much
trade clout may not be heard in the WTO forum. These demands can be lost as a result of the functioning
of the EC and thereby never emerge in the WTO arena. An example would be the lack of action on the
part of the EC on behalf of Member States in relation to agriculture.
After negotiating the agreement, it must be ratified. Any EU Member State can prevent an
agreement from being finalized. WTO Agreements are subject to adoption by the EU Council of
Ministers and, sometimes also by the European Parliament, as well as ratification by national parliaments.
This means that it is quite possible to have a delay in presenting ratification to parliament.

2.-Transparency and Clarity

Another criterion is transparency.219 In the Trade Policy Review of the WTO, it was impossible to discern
who in the EC was responsible for negotiations, who made the actual decisions and with whom

218
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negotiations had to be conducted. With EU enlargement, the current situation will deteriorate.220 Thus,
from the point of view of the WTO, the EC has become both a powerful but also a difficult negotiating
partner.221
Given the lack of transparency of the current democratic system, accountability of the governing
forces depends on their respective competences. In a proper democratic forum, it is therefore imperative
for the populace to know the competences of the governments. There is a difference of competences in
the national and the transnational level. There needs to be a clear transparent mechanism whereby the
people are in a position to understand which government to hold accountable for which action.
As for clarity, any set-up which involves an exercise of power at two levels –national and
supranational - by numerous bodies requires clarity and precision with which the powers have been
delineated. By this I do not mean that all overlap be avoided at all times, which is hardly possible, but that
all efforts be made to avoid clashes which can be foreseen. In my opinion, the division as it stands in the
Nice Treaty fails on this criterion miserably. There are no provisions in the treaties describing the
principles governing the allocation of competence between the EC and its Member States. Furthermore,
the treaties are drafted in a complex manner, as a result of political compromises. Moreover, there is
misunderstanding and false ideas about the extent of the EU’s legislative competence because of lack of
clarity. Along these lines, the French Government has initiated an internet campaign to explain in a clear
manner what the EU process of integration is about.222

and they are working to produce clearer and more readable documents. This includes better drafting of laws and, ultimately, a
single, simplified EU Cosntitutional Treaty.
220
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The steady evolution of the EU has resulted in a complex organization of competences in the
treaties. The legal provisions covering the distribution of EC competences are dispersed over the EC
Treaty. This renders the system opaque and difficult to understand. In turn, this lack of clarity hampers
democratic control, as it is unclear where political responsibility lies. This is perhaps due to lack of
political will. Political responsibility and democratic control would be made easier if power were not so
dispersed.
The Nice and Laeken European Councils requested that the delimitation of competence between
the EC and its Member States be examined in order to respond to criticism that the EC should take less
action in certain areas and more in others. The EC has a tendency to legislate in areas in which it is not
competent or in which it is not appropriate for the EC to do so. At the moment, the system of delimitation
of competences between the EC and its Member States lacks clarity for various reasons: a) amendments
to the EU Treaties of provisions drafted in a complex manner, as a result of political compromises; b) the
fact that neither the system for delimiting powers, nor the principles governing such a delimitation, nor
the types of competence available to the EU and the areas covered by each type of competence are clearly
defined by the EC Treaty; and finally, c) the new methods of coordination, which set objectives without
taking into account the allocation of powers.
All these reasons contribute to the lack of clarity and give the impression that the EC’s powers are
very broad, when in fact this is not the case. Thus, misunderstandings and false ideas about the extent of
the EC’s legislative competence often exist.223 The competences today appear in the EU Constitutional
Treaty in a vague form. The concepts of exclusive and concurrent competences could be more clearly
defined. This would clarify the fields for which the principle of subsidiarity applies (i.e., only concurrent

January 18, 2006, available at http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-151644-16&type=News (last visited January
22, 2006). Other related articles are: Euractiv, “Transparency Initiative,” June 8, 2005, available at
http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/transparency-initiative/article-140650 (last visited July 18, 2006); Euractiv, “French civil
society jumps into the transparency debate,” June 19, 2006, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/french-civil-societyjumps-transparency-debate/article-156200 (last visited July 18, 2006).
223
The European Convention, The Secretariat, Discussion Paper: “Delimitation of Competence between the European Union
and the Member States. –Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored,” CON 47/02, kin/MM/ac, p. 12.
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competence).224 It can be envisaged to combine this exercise with a re-ordering of the treaties along
logical lines. This could increase the clarity of the text, making it easier to locate responsibility. In this
respect, another main problem is the failure to comply with the principle of subsidiarity and
proportionality. One should conceive the principle of subsidiarity as a mechanism to regulate the
implementation of the EC’s non-exclusive powers. Interestingly, the principle of loyal cooperation was
not taken into account during the distribution of competences between the Union and its Member States at
the time of the drafting of the EU Constitutional Treaty. However, the principles of subsidiarity,
proportionality and the attribution principle do appear in the Constitutional Treaty (Article I-9).225

3.- Coherence/Consistency

There is lack of precision of certain provisions of the EC Treaty: a minority has requested that the
existing system be replaced by a “catalogue” of competences.226 A large majority, however, argues for
keeping the evolution of competences flexible and dynamic. Also, a transfer of activities from the
national to the supranational level would increase the coherence/consistency of the EC’s position in world
trade negotiations. Another way to explain the lack of coherence is the fact that the EC’s powers do not
match citizens’ expectations: citizens want the EC to play a greater role in certain areas, but also find that
the EC intervenes too much in other areas.
224

For Community action to be justified, both aspects of the subsidiarity principle shall be met: the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the EU Member States’ action in the framework of their national constitutional
system, and these objectives can therefore be better achieved by action on the part of the European Community. The following
guidelines can be used when examining whether these two conditions are fulfilled: 1) the isse under consideration has
transnational aspects that cannot be satisfactorily regulated by Member States’ actions; 2) actions by Member States alone
would significantly damage Member States’ interests; and 3) action at the supranational level would produce clear benefits by
reason of its scale or effects compared with action at the national level. Of course, when speaking of benefits, one wonders:
benefits for whom? The supranational elites? Or the national citizens? And how to prove this benefit objectively?
225
“The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral.” This means that Union competences are
strictly conferral, they are laid down in the Constitutional Treaty, or they are established according to a specified procedure.
Without this principle, “competences not conferred upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the Member States.”
(Article I-9 [2]).
226
For an analysis against the creation of a rigid competence catalogue, see Swenden, W. “Is the European Union in Need of a
Competence Catalogue? Insights from Comparative Federalism,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 2004, Vol. 42, No. 2,
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4.- Accountability

Legitimacy (or accountability) and efficiency tend to go hand-in-hand. Ideally, each government should
be able to make its policies in its own spheres of activity, without referring too much to other
governments’ activities. Each government would be accountable to its own electorate, and each voter
would know precisely which government deserves the credit or blame for a particular output of public
policy. However, and unfortunately, many practical reasons prevent this ideal from being achieved. This
means, for practical purposes, that in certain circumstances accountability must be sacrificed for the sake
of other criteria. A high request of accountability would reduce the margin of maneuver of EC trade
negotiators and complicate their ability to conclude complex international agreements. So is there a
political and institutional mechanism whereby efficiency and accountability, two sides of the same coin,
are complementary of each other?
In relation to checking the delimitation of competences, there is a poor system of ensuring compliance
with the delimitation of competences: at present, political monitoring of compliance with the delimitation
of competences is exercised mainly by the EU institutions. Legislative bodies at the national level
(national parliaments) exercise that monitoring to a lesser degree. We offer two types of checks to ensure
compliance with the delimitation of competences:
1. Political control: it rests with the EU institutions which participate in the legislative process. Each
institution must act in accordance with the powers allocated to it. National governments, national
parliaments, and public opinion also exercise such a control to the extent that they control the
positions adopted by their government representatives in the Council; and
2. Judicial control: by appeal to the ECJ or national courts.

pp. 371-92.
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After analyzing the criteria for the evaluation of the distribution of powers and its compliance, we ask
why we have a delimitation of competences. In the current system of EU foreign policy, we find several
constitutional problems:227
1. Inadequate parliamentary control: The EU has constitutionally weak governance structures. The EC’s
integration policy raises problems of democratic legitimacy to the extent that it is not effectively
controlled by parliaments (for example, in the foreign trade policy area), and focuses more on the
protection of powerful interest groups than on the general interests and equal rights of EU citizens (for
example, consumers and tax-payers). So the question araises: is it in the interest of the EU citizens to
have a common commercial policy without a parliamentary control?
2. Constitutional limitations of government powers by rule of law, fundamental rights, separation of
powers and democratic participation are not effectively applied in foreign policy powers. Therefore, the
rights of domestic citizens are less effectively protected against abuses of foreign policy powers of
governments (for instance, Article 133 EC) than vis-à-vis their domestic policy powers. Certainly, these
power-oriented EU foreign policies can undermine the rule of law within the EU. It is relevant to mention
in this respect the limited role of the European Parliament in the EC’s common commercial policy. Hence
the importance of EU institutional reforms.228
3. The division between private powers of EU citizens and government powers seems to be more
important than the division between national and EU government powers.

IV. Definition of Mixed Agreements229

227

Petersmann, E.-U. “The Foreign Policy Constitution of the European Union: A Kantian Perspective,” in
Immenga/Moeschel/Reuter (eds.) Festschrift fuerErnst-Joachim Mestmaecher (Nomos, 1996), pp. 433-447, at 435.
228
It was at the Nice IGC that the then 15 EU Member States established framework guidelines in order to pursue EU
institutional reforms. The European Council of Stockholm in March 2001 already reaffirmed this objective, and the various
modalities were established in Laeken in December 2001 with the Declaration on the Future of Europe, and the decision to call
for a Convention.
229
In 1961, Pierre Pescatore spoke of “accords mixtes, mi-gouvernementaux, mi-communautaires, conclus conjointement par
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Mixed agreements are agreements where both the EC and its Member States are contracting parties, on
the European side, to an international agreement with a third party. The notion of mixed agreement is not
normally understood to cover a situation where an agreement falls within the competence of the EC and
partly within that of the Member States, but rather a situation where Member States are in a position to
become parties to it.230 In such a case, the EC competence may be exercised through the medium of the
Member States acting jointly in the interest of the EC.231 While it may be largely unknown to the general
public, mixity (or mixed agreements) has become part of the daily life of the EC external relations.
Mixity has also been a very complex topic for scholarly debate.232
Interestingly enough, mixed agreements, important as they are, were not foreseen in the Treaty of
Rome. However, the concept does appear in the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community,233 and is incidentally inscribed in the Nice Treaty in Article 133 (6). As Granvik correctly

les Etats membres et la Communaute,” 103 Hague Recueil 1961/II p. 104.
230
The possibility of mixed agreements is expressly recognized in Article 102 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community (EURATOM). The expression “mixed agreements” has been used by the Court of Justice, e.g.,, in Case
12/86 Demirel [1987] ECJ 3719 at 3751 (paragraph 8). See also O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements,
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983; Dolmans, M. J. F. M. Problems of Mixed Agreements: Division of Powers within
the EEC and the Right of Third States, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985; Neuwahl, N. “Joint Participation in International
Treaties and the Exercise of Powers by the EEC and Its Member States: Mixed Agreements,” (1991) 28 COMMON
MKT.L.REV., pp. 717-740; MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 142-164.
231
See Opinion 2/91 [1993] E.C.R. I-1061, para. 5 on the ILO Convention No. 170 on Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work,
which is only open to Members of the ILO (Art. 21).
232
Most of the relevant literature is in the more general context of the EC external relations; see, Timmermans, C. & Völker, E.
(eds.) Division of Powers between the European Communities and their Member States in the Field of External Relations,
Kluwer, 1981; O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983; Dolmans,
M.J.F.M. Problems of Mixed Agreements: Division of Powers Within the EEC and the Right of Third States, Asser Instituut,
1985; Groux & Manin, The European Communities in the International Order, Commission of the European Communities,
1995, pp. 57-88; Conze, A. Die voelkerrechtliche Haftung der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft, Nomos, 1987, pp. 73-87;
Neuwahl, “Joint Participation in International Treaties and the Exercise of Powers by the EEC and its Member States: Mixed
Agreements,” Common Market Law Review, 28, 1991, pp. 717-740; idem, “Shared Powers or Combined Imcompetence? More
on Mixity,” Common Market Law Review, 33, 1996, pp. 667-687; Frid, R. The Relations between the EC and International
Organizations. Legal Theory and Practice, Kluwer Law Inernational, 1995, pp. 111-116; Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S.
The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 142-164; Kaniel, M. The Exclusive
Treaty-Making Power of the European Community up to the Period of the Single European Act, Kluwer, 1996, pp. 145-174;
McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, pp. 78-88; Bourgeois, J., Dewost, J. &
Gaiffe, M. La Communauté européenne et les accords mixtes, Quelles perspectives?, Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes,
1997; Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, notably
articles written by Dashwood (pp. 113-123), Rosas (pp. 125-148) and Granvik (pp. 255-272).
233
It is precisely in Article 102, which reads: “Agreements or contracts concluded with a third State…to which, in addition to
the Community, one or more Member States are parties, shall not enter into force until the Commission has been notified by all
the Member States concerned that those agreements or contracts have become applicable in accordance with the provisions of
their respective national laws”.
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asserts, “the very same article [Article 102 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community] has later been accepted [by EC law-makers] as a suitable model for the EC.”234 In this same
line of thought, Macleod et al. point out that there is no doubt about the existence and legal validity of the
concept of "mixed agreement". Proof of this is Article 102 of the Euratom Treaty,235 where “a form of
mixed agreement is recognized and which [Art 102] makes explicit provisions for treaties which are to be
concluded by the Community and one or more Member States."236 It is, nevertheless, unfortunate that the
Constitutional Treaty did not take into account the express recognition of mixed agreements in the legal
text.
The legal phenomenon of mixed agreements poses various complex issues, such as the fact that
these agreements must be ratified by all the EU national parliaments of the countries which are
contracting parties to that given mixed agreement. Consequently, this creates uncertainty as to the liability
of the EC and its Member States to third parties,237 as well as the limits of the ECJ’s competence to
interpret such agreements. In addition to what has been said above, there are various important
clarifications to be mentioned in this subtitle in order to facilitate the understanding of the issue. Here are
some of them:

1. Since the early 1960s, the mixed procedure as a legal phenomenon has been used in a wide field
of policy areas ranging from commercial policy to environmental policy,238 from cooperation to

234

Granvik, L. Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of Bindingness, in
Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998,
p. 256.
235
Article 102 Euratom reads:
Agreements or contracts concluded with a third State, an international organisation or a national of a third State to which, in
addition to the Community, one or more Member States are parties, shall not enter into force until the Commission has been
notified by all the Member States concerned that those agreements or contracts have become applicable in accordance with the
provisions of their respective national laws.
236
MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 143-4.
237
See heading infra “Implications of Mixed Agreements for Third Parties.”
238
Koutrakos, P. “I need to hear you say it: Revisiting the Scope of the CCP,” Yearbook of European Law 407 (2003); Van
Calster, “The EU, Trade, Environment and Unilateralism: Passing the Buck,” European Foreign Affairs Review 9 (2000);
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the management and conservation of the resources of the sea. The general trend towards the use of
the mixed formula both in the multilateral and bilateral239 contexts seems to be continuing.240
2. There should be no doubt about the general validity or actual practical significance of the mixed
procedure since important EC and Member States’ policy areas of international relations are
organized based on the mixed agreements technique. This, as a matter of principle, is not
contested on any legal grounds any more.241
3. The European Court of Justice has recognized in its Ruling 1/78, Opinion 1/78, Opinion 2/91 and
Opinion 1/94 (Re WTO Agreement) inter alia that some agreements require the participation of
both the Community and the Member States.242 From here one can deduce that not all Community
competence is exclusive.243 Furthermore, in the everyday practice of the Community institutions
we see that the concept of mixed agreement is a well-established part of EC law.244 An example of

Scott, J. EC Environmental Law, Longmans, 1998; Demaret, “Environmental Policy and Commercial Policy: The Emergence
of Trade-Related Environmental Measures (TREMS) in the External Relations of the European Community,” in Maresceau.
M. (ed.) The European Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal Dimension, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993;
Geradin, “Trade and Environmental Protection in the context of World Trade Rules: A View from the EU,” 2 European
Foreign Affairs Review 33 (1997); Scott, J. “On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and
WTO,” Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/99, available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990301.html (last visited
August 29, 2006); Ward, “Common but Differentiated Debates: Environment, Labour and the WTO,” 45 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 592 (1996); Schoenbaum, “International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The
Continuing Search for Reconciliation,” 91 American Journal of International Law 268 (1997); Qureshi, “Extraterritorial
Shrimps, NGO’s and the WTO Appellate Body,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 199 (1999); Eggers &
Mackenzie, “The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,” 3 Journal of International Economic Law 525 (2000); Krenzler &
MacGregor, “GM Food: The Next Major Transatlantic Trade War?” 5 European Foreign Affairs Review 287 (2000);
Francioni, F. (ed.) Environment, Human Rights and International Trade, Hart, 2001; Dillon, International Trade and
Economic Law and the European Union, Hart, 2002, chapter 5.
239
Almost all the EC’s association agreements under article 310 EC have been concluded as mixed agreements, being the only
exceptions the agreements with Cyprus and Malta. See OJ L 133 [1973] p.2 (Republic of Cyprus) and OJ L 61 [1971] p. 2
(Malta).
240
Heliskoski, J. Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European Community
and its Member States, Kluwer Law International, 2001, pp. 2-3.
241
Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp.
143-144. For previous criticism, see Testa, G. “L’intervention des Etats membres dans la procedure de conclusion des accords
d’association de la Communaute economique europeenne,” 2 CDE (1966) p. 502 et seq. and Costonis, J. “The Treaty-Making
Power of the European Economic Community: The Perspective of a Decade,” V CMLRev. (1967-1968), pp. 451-453.
242
Ruling 1/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2151; Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871; Opinion 2/91, [1993] ECR I-1061 at para. 5; and Opinion
1/94 [1995].
243
See Opinion 2/91 [1993] E.C.R. I-1061, para. 5 on the ILO Convention No. 170 on Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work,
which is only open to Members of the ILO (Art. 21).
244
MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford,
1996, at 144.
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this is Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwaebisch Gmuend,245 in which the European Court of
Justice used the term "mixed agreement" to describe the Association Agreement between the
Community and the Member States on the one hand and Turkey on the other.
4. It is a fact of life that mixed agreements raise difficult and interesting legal and political issues
about the role of the Communities and the Member States in the international arena. Despite the
legal uncertainties, in practice the Community and the Member States participate together
effectively in various international agreements.246 It is precisely in the field of international treaty
law that mixed agreements show the changes that international law has undergone through the
establishment of entities such as the EC.247
5. In this same line of thought, Allan Rosas argues that:
“the European Union being a hybrid conglomerate situated somewhere between a
State and an intergovernmental organization, it is only natural that its external relations in
general and treaty practice in particular should not be straightforward. The phenomenon of
mixed agreements [...] offers a telling illustration of the complex nature of the EU and the
Communities as an international actor”.248

We speak of complex nature since the circumstance which has to occur is to have an agreement
which is a Community and a national agreement at the same time. This means that Europe has 25
voices (one for each Member State) plus one more voice coming from any of the European
Communities.
6. The phenomenon of mixed agreements is, therefore, not only deeply interrelated to EC law and its
division of powers doctrine but it is also interrelated to public international law. As for the
division of powers, McGoldrick points out that “each international agreement will require
consideration of its subject matter to determine the allocation of competence between the EC and

245

1987 E.C.R. 3719 at 3751, paragraph 8.
MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S, The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford,
1996, at 144.
247
Tomuschat, C. Liability for Mixed Agreements, in O’Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law
and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 125-32.
248
Rosas, A. Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 125.
246
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the Member States, and the nature of that competence.”249 This allocation of competence can
evolve over the lifetime of an agreement [this is so even during the drafting of an agreement,
being an example of it Case C-24/95, Commission v UK (FAO Fisheries Agreement)]250 or series
of agreements. This has been the case with the GATT.251 According to public international law,
the rights and obligations which derive from an agreement form an undivided entity. This,
however, does not necessarily mean that the EC and its Member States cannot respect the internal
division of competence according to EC law.252

V. Inadequate Explanation of Mixed Agreements

In his book Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European
Community and its Member States,253 Heliskoski rightly points out the lack of adequate contextual legal
principles among legal scholars who pursue legal analyses of mixed agreements.254
If the EC and its Member States both participate in international agreements, it is due to the
limited scope of the EC’s competence in international relations.255 The international rights and obligations

249

MCGOLDRICK, International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, at 78-9.
1996 E.C.R. nyr.
251
For further detail, see Petersmann, E.-U. Participation of the European Communities in the GATT: International Law and
Community Law Aspects, in O’KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation
Publishers, 1983, pp 167-98. See also MCGOLDRICK, International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997,
at 118 and 121.
252
Gaja, G. The European Community’s Rights and Obligations under Mixed Agreements, in O’KEEFFE, D. &
SCHERMERS, H. MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp 133-140.
253
Heliskoski, J. Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European Community
and its Member States, Kluwer Law International, 2001, p. 7.
254
See as examples which denounce this fact works by Stein, K. D., Der gemischte Vertrag im Recht der Aussenbeziehungen
der Europaeischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin, 1986, and Dolmans, M. Problems of Mixed
Agreements, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985.
255
The scope of the common commercial policy has been subject of political and legal debate for a long time: Ehlermann, C.D. “The Scope of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty,” in Melanges Offerts a Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Paris, Pedone, 1984, pp. 14869; Bourgeois, J. “The Common Commercial Policy: Scope and Nature of the Powers,” in Voelker, E.L.M. (ed.) Protectionism
and the European Community, 2nd edition, Kluwer, 1986; Cremona, M. “The Completion of the Internal Market and the
Incomplete Commercial Policy of the European Community,” 15 European Law Review, 283-97, (1990); Maresceau, M. (ed.)
The European Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal Dimension, Nijhoff, 1993; Eeckhout, P. The European
Internal Market and International Trade, Clarendon Press, 1994; Chalmers, D. “Legal Basis and External Relations of the
European Community,” in Emiliou, N. & O’Keeffe, D. (eds.) The European Union and World Trade Law – After the GATT
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of an institution such as the EC depend on its functions and purposes. The EC is based on general and
limited attribution of legal authority laid down by the EC Treaty.256 Often times, a particular international
agreement goes beyond the EC’s competence or legal authority to act. In such cases, Member States
assume the remainder of treaty commitments. This is the legal reason for having recourse to the mixed
procedure.257
Quite frequently, the justification for the conclusion of an agreement as mixed relates to the nature
of the EC’s competence. The ECJ recognizes that EC competence does not necessarily exclude that of
Member States’ and it may be up to Member States to take part in the agreement together with the EC.258
Most legal scholars tend to rely on non-contextual general principles when dealing with mixed
agreements. This means that the criterion for the division of powers between the EC and its Member
States has turned into a scheme of interpretation by which the different legal questions arising in relation
to mixed agreements such as implementation, responsibility,..., could be addressed. This means that the
practice of mixed agreements is not analyzed since the conception is purely non-contextual.259
When giving a legal analysis of mixed agreements, one should also incorporate the EC’s and
Member States’ treaty partners. Legal scholars have admitted that the various rules and principles to be
applied do not only emanate from EC and national law but also from international law.260 Why is it so
important to include third parties when trying to reach a proper conception of the mixed procedure?
Simply because without them there would be no international agreement. Any conception of mixed
Uruguay Round, Wiley, 1996; Cremona, M. “Neutrality or Discrimination? The WTO, the EU and External Trade,” in de
Burca, G. & Scott, J. (eds.) The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues, Hart Publishing, 2001.
256
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 180;
Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL 1964 E.C.R. 585, p. 593.
257
Dolmans, M. Problems of Mixed Agreements, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985, p. 95.
258
Dashwood, A. & Heliskoski, J. “The Classical Authorities Revisited” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General
Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2000, p. 17. See also Heliskoski, J. Mixed Agreements as a
Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European Community and its Member States, Kluwer Law
International, 2001, pp. 36-46.
259
Stein, K. D., Der gemischte Vertrag im Recht der Aussenbeziehungen der Europaeischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Duncker
& Humbolt, Berlin, 1986, p. 61 et seq. and Dolmans, M. Problems of Mixed Agreements, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985, p.
15 et seq.
260
The international law aspect clearly appears in the contributions by Phillip Allott (p. 97), Christina Tomuschat (p. 125),
Giorgio Gaja (p. 133) and Albert Bleckmann (p. 155) in O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and
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agreements without taking into account third parties would be a partial approach and, therefore, an
inadequate explanation of this legal phenomenon.
On the international law front, we perceive that neither the EC Treaties, nor Community
legislation, nor the ECJ’s case-law is binding on the other contracting parties. If the practice of mixed
agreements is neglected, then one could argue that the general principles of international law261 seem to
be transplanted to the specific context of the EC and Member States’ external relations in general and
mixed agreements in particular. In this line of thought, we can quote Albert Bleckmann: “in order to find
a solution to [the] problem [of judicial positions of the different parties to a mixed agreement], we have
necessarily to refer to the general principles of interpretation of public international law.”262 That said, the
scope of such principles tends to be unclear and controversial. Quoting again Bleckmann, “[the] general
principles to which we refer have not, as yet, been clearly established by public international law.”263 The
general principles might “...be excluded if an analysis of interests of the parties regulated by the treaty
indicates a different solution.”264
When dealing with legal analyses of mixed agreements, this is the current state of the art. It is,
therefore, important to clarify the unlimited number of questions concerning the legal implications of the
mixed procedure which constantly arise in the actual practice of the EC’s external relations.

VI. Typology of Mixed Agreements265

Taxation Publishers, 1983. However, there is no international law treatise on the topic.
261
Be them, effet utile, good faith, equality among others.
262
Bleckmann, A., in O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, p. 157.
263
Id.
264
Id., p. 160.
265
Schermers, H. A Typology of Mixed Agreements, in O’KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer
Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 22-33; DOLMANS, M. J. F. M. PROBLEMS OF MIXED AGREEMENTS:
DIVISION OF POWERS WITHIN THE EEC AND THE RIGHT OF THIRD STATES, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985, p.
25, 39-42; Rosas, A. Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 125-148 at 128-133; MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT,
S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 143; Tognazzi G., Nozione e
classificazione degli accordi misti, in Dir. Com. Sc. Int. 1994, 590.
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Since there are many different types of mixed agreements, depending on how they are categorized, the
answer to the question they raise may vary dramatically. Let us, then, see some ways of classification.
Allan Rosas makes a basic distinction between parallel and shared competences:266

A.- Type of Competence

The terminology used in the doctrine is very unclear: non-exclusive, shared, parallel, joint, concurrent,
and divided competence of the EC. These terms are used here to describe the same phenomenon, i.e. the
potential powers which the EC may exercise if the Council so decides and which, when exercised, may
turn into exclusive EC competence.267 However, as we will see later, it is inappropriate to use the locution
“parallel competence” to refer to a situation where non-exclusive EC competence turns out to be
exclusive EC competence. Again, the doctrine is imprecise in its terminology.268

A.1.- Parallel Competences

Parallel competences “implies that the Community may adhere to a treaty, with full rights and obligations
as any other Contracting Party, this having no direct effect on the rights and obligations of Member States
being parties to the same treaty.”269 However, this situation might have indirect effect on the rights and
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Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ED.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 128-33.
267
The fundamental principle of EC law is the principle that the EC’s powers are attributed to the EC by the Member States.
On this, see Kapteyn, P.J.G. & VerLoren van Themaat, P. Introduction to the Law of the European Communities, 2nd edition,
1989, chapter IV, 1.3; For a discussion on the principle, see Barents, R. “The Internal Market Unlimited: some observations on
the legal basis of Community legislation,” 30 Common Market Law Review, p. 85, 1993.
268
To make the terminological confusion ever greater, while international law uses the term power or jurisdiction, EC law has
usually adopted the term competence. Furthermore, the ECJ has used both competence and power interchangeably. See
Tridimas, T. & Eeckhout, P. “The External Competence of the Community and the Case-Law of the Court of Justice: Principle
versus Pragmatism,” 14 Yearbook of European Law, pp. 143-77, at 144, (1995); Neuwahl, N. “Joint Participation in
International Treaties and the exercise of power by the EEC and its Member States: Mixed Agreements,” 28 Common Market
Law Review, pp. 717-40, at 718, (1991); Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European
Communities: A Manual of Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 38-9.
269
As far as parallel competence is concerned, Schermers, H. G. notes in “A Typology of Mixed Agreements” IN O´KEEFFE,
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obligations of the Member States.270 For example, the Agreement establishing the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),271 which is open to States and the EC alike,272 obliges “each
Contracting Party to provide financial resources as a loan or grant to a third State or international fund
(assuming that the participation of the EC would be covered by the Community budget).”273 The given
situation can be more complex if financial assistance does not come from the Community budget but
from a separate fund, consisting of Member States’ contributions and based on a separate internal
agreement between or among the Member States. An example of it could be Case C-316/91 Parliament v
Council274 as well as Opinion 1/78 (Re Draft International Agreement on Natural Rubber).275
Another example could well be the adherence to the 1989 Protocol Relating to the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, prompted by the need to protect the
Community trademark.276 According to Article 10 of the Madrid Protocol, each Contracting Party,

D. & SCHERMERS, H. MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, that such treaties, which are
covered by a formal (as distinct from a substantial) definition of mixed agreements, are “inherently…not of a mixed nature”.
270
For a discussion on the conclusion of external international agreements and their effect on Community law and the law of
the EU Member States, see Neuwahl, N. “Individuals and the GATT: Direct Effect and Indirect Effects of the GATT in
Community Law,” in Emiliou & O’Keeffe, D. The European Union and World Trade Law after the GATT Uruguay Round,
Wiley, 1996; Lee & Kennedy, “The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in EC Law,” 30 Journal of World Trade 67
(1996); Leigh, Blakeslee & Ederington (eds.) National Treaty Law and Practice (ASIL 1999).
271

Founded in 1991, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) uses the tools of investment to help
build market economies and democracies in 27 countries from central Europe to central Asia. The EBRD is owned by 60
countries and two intergovernmental institutions. Despite its public sector shareholders, it invests mainly in private enterprises,
usually together with commercial partners. The EBRD provides project financing for banks, industries, and businesses, both
new ventures and investments in existing companies. It also works with publicly-owned companies to support privatization,
restructuring state-owned firms, and improvement of municipal services. The EBRD’s mandate stipulates that it must only
work in countries that are committed to democratic principles. The EBRD is directed by its founding agreement to promote, in
the full range of its activities, environmentally sound and sustainable development. For more information on the EBRD, see
MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford,
1996, at 187-89.
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1990 OJ L372/1.
MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford,
1996, at 129.
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1994 E.C.R. I-625.
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1979 E.C.R. 2871.
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22, 1996.
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including the EC, has one vote.277 This implies that the EC and its Member States may have altogether 26
votes, a principle contested by the United States, which has so far refused to adhere to the Protocol.278

A.2.- Shared Competences

As for shared competences, they imply some division of the rights and obligations in the agreement
between the Community and the Member States. According to Dolmans, one can distinguish between
277

Article 10 of the 1989 Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks
reads:
(1)
(a) The Contracting Parties shall be members of the same Assembly as the countries party to the Madrid (Stockholm)
Agreement.
(b) Each Contracting Party shall be represented in that Assembly by one delegate, who may be assisted by alternate delegates,
advisors, and experts.
(c) The expenses of each delegation shall be borne by the Contracting Party which has appointed it, except for the travel
expenses and the subsistence allowance of one delegate for each Contracting Party, which shall be paid from the funds of the
Union.
(2) The Assembly shall, in addition to the functions which it has under the Madrid (Stockholm) Agreement, also
(i) deal with all matters concerning the implementation of this Protocol;
(ii) give directions to the International Bureau concerning the preparation for conferences of revision of this Protocol, due
account being taken of any comments made by those countries of the Union which are not party to this Protocol;
(iii) adopt and modify the provisions of the Regulations concerning the implementation of this Protocol;
(iv) perform such other functions as are appropriate under this Protocol.
(3)
(a) Each Contracting Party shall have one vote in the Assembly. On matters concerning only countries that are party to the
Madrid (Stockholm) Agreement, Contracting Parties that are not party to the said Agreement shall not have the right to vote,
whereas, on matters concerning only Contracting Parties, only the latter shall have the right to vote.
(b) One–half of the members of the Assembly which have the right to vote on a given matter shall constitute the quorum for
the purposes of the vote on that matter.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (b), if, in any session, the number of the members of the Assembly having
the right to vote on a given matter which are represented is less than one–half but equal to or more than one–third of the
members of the Assembly having the right to vote on that matter, the Assembly may make decisions but, with the exception of
decisions concerning its own procedure, all such decisions shall take effect only if the conditions set forth hereinafter are
fulfilled. The International Bureau shall communicate the said decisions to the members of the Assembly having the right to
vote on the said matter which were not represented and shall invite them to express in writing their vote or abstention within a
period of three months from the date of the communication. If, at the expiry of this period, the number of such members
having thus expressed their vote or abstention attains the number of the members which was lacking for attaining the quorum
in the session itself, such decisions shall take effect provided that at the same time the required majority still obtains.
(d) Subject to the provisions of Articles 5(2)(e), 9sexies(2), 12 and 13(2), the decisions of the Assembly shall require two–
thirds of the votes cast.
(e) Abstentions shall not be considered as votes.
(f) A delegate may represent, and vote in the name of, one member of the Assembly only.
(4) In addition to meeting in ordinary sessions and extraordinary sessions as provided for by the Madrid (Stockholm)
Agreement, the Assembly shall meet in extraordinary session upon convocation by the Director General, at the request of one–
fourth of the members of the Assembly having the right to vote on the matters proposed to be included in the agenda of the
session. The agenda of such an extraordinary session shall be prepared by the Director General.
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mixed agreements with coexistent competence and mixed agreements with concurrent competence.279 Let
us start with the latter case.

A.2.a.- Concurrent Competences

A mixed agreement with concurrent competences implies that the agreement in question forms a certain
whole or totality which is indivisible or cannot be separated into two parts. P. Allot, when referring to
concurrent competence, speaks of mixed agreements “in the strong sense”, meaning that the Community
and Member States participation is “inextricably confused”.280 Such a truly shared-competences situation
may arise principally if there is a non-exclusive Community competence covering the whole and entire
agreement. Articles 111, paragraph 5 (agreements relating to economic and monetary policy), 174,
paragraph 4 (environmental agreements) and 181 paragraph 2 (agreements relating to development
cooperation) of the EC Treaty provide that not only the Community, but also the Member States, may
negotiate in international bodies and conclude international agreements. Nevertheless, according to a
Declaration on Articles 111, 174 and 181 EC contained in the Final Act of the TEU, this (non-exclusive)
competence is subject to the European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA) judgment of the European
Court of Justice, that is to say, the principle by which the adoption of common rules by the Community
may create exclusive Community competences also on the fields covered by the said Articles.
There are also other areas where the Community may have a non-exclusive competence to
conclude agreements if it has a corresponding competence to establish internal rules and this specific
competence has not yet been used. In this respect, we have as examples the joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76

278

Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in DASHWOOD, A. & HILLION, C. (eds.) THE GENERAL
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 203.
279
DOLMANS, M. J. F. M. PROBLEMS OF MIXED AGREEMENTS: DIVISION OF POWERS WITHIN THE EEC AND
THE RIGHT OF THIRD STATES, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985, p. 25, 39-42, 97.
280
Allot, P "Adherance and Withdrawal from Mixed Agreements" in O´KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. (EDS.) MIXED
AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, p. 118-9.
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Kramer,281 as well as Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention No. 170)282 and Opinion 2/92 (OECD National
Treatment Instrument).283 According to A. Rosas, even if this specific competence has been used, "the
external competence may rest at least partly non-exclusive if the common internal rules are considered as
minimum rules only284 ...[as an example we have Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention No. 170)285]... or [if the
common internal rules] do not cover the whole area regulated in the international agreement.286"287 An
example of the latter case is Opinion 1/94 (WTO Agreement).

A.2.b.- Coexistent Competences

As for mixed agreements with coexistent competence, since the agreements contain provisions which fall
under the exclusive competence of the Community and/or the Member States, respectively,288 it is “in
principle possible to divide it into two separate parts, for which either the Community or the Member
States are responsible.”289 Rosas suggests, as an example of this, a treaty containing one chapter on trade
in goods and another on military defence. This situation could be seen as if we were dealing with two
different treaties presented in one document.290 In this respect, P. Allot notes that for such mixed
agreements “in the weak sense” it should not be possible to separate completely the Community and

281

1976 E.C.R. 1303 at 1308-1309 (paragraphs 19-34). See Koers, A.W. “The External Authority of the EEC in Regard to
Marine Fisheries,” 14 Common Market Law Review, pp. 269-301, (1977).
282
1993 E.C.R. I-1061 at 1076-1077 (paragraphs 7, 12).
283
1995 E.C.R. I-521 at 558-560.
284
(footnote original) Opinion 2/91 at 1078-1080 and MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of
the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 66.
285
1993 E.C.R. I-1061 at 1078-1080.
286
(footnote original) See notably Opinion 1/94 (WTO Agreement) [1994] ECR I-5267.
287
Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 131.
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Cremona, M. “The Doctrine of Exclusivity and the Position of Mixed Agreements,” 2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 393
(1982); Cremona, M. “External Relations and External Competence: The Emergence of an Integrated Policy,” in Craig, P. &
de Burca (eds.) The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 137-75; Koutrakos, P. “The Interpretation of
Mixed Agreements under the Preliminary Reference Procedure,” 7 European Foreign Affairs Review, 25 (2002).
289
Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ED.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 128-33, at 129.
290
Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in DASHWOOD, A. & HILLION, C. (eds.) THE GENERAL
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 204.
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Member States parts of the agreement.291 In the book by Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External
Relations of the European Communities, (1996), the authors mention as an example the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material Convention discussed in Ruling 1/78 (See Ruling 1/78, Re the Draft
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports).292
If there are real national competences involved which "coexist" with EC competences, then the
nature of the agreement may make it difficult to separate the agreement into two parts.293 In this respect,
the ECJ has said that the Community and the Member States share competence where an agreement
covers both matters within the exclusive competences of the Member States and matters within the
exclusive competence of the EC.294 An example which gives evidence of this is the Natural Rubber
Opinion 1/78, which addressed a scheme where, under a commodity agreement,295 Member States would
have directly financed the agreement, with the pertinent implications for its decision-making procedures,
even if the essential policy of such an agreement came within the Community's exclusive competence
under Article 133 EC.296 On the relevance of Member State financing of the agreement, see Opinion 1/94
(Re WTO Agreement)297 and Case C-316/91, Parliament v. Council298 and Opinion of Advocate-General
Jacobs, paragraphs 55-59. This Natural Rubber case is related to Community participation in
commodities agreements in pursuance of the common commercial policy.
In the case of coexistent competence, there is what Rosas calls a presumed "horizontal" (sectorial)
distribution of competences (commercial policy, due to trade in goods, and defence policy, due to military
291

Allot, P. "Adherence to and Withdrawl from Mixed Agreements" IN O´KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. (eds.) MIXED
AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 97-121 at pp. 118-119.
292
1978 E.C.R. 2151.
293
MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford,
1996, at 131.
294
MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford,
1996, at 65.
295
On commodity agreements, see Garden-Ashworth, F. International Commodity Control: A Contemporary History and
Appraisal, London: Croom-Helm, 1984; Ernst, E. International Commodity Agreements: The System of Controlling the
International Commodity Market, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982; Khan, Kabir-ur-Rahman The Law and Organization of
International Commodity Agreements, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
296
See 1979 E.C.R. 2871, at 2917-2918 (paragraphs 57-60); 1978 E.C.R. 2151, at 2180 (paragraph 36); MACLEOD, I.,
HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 65.
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1995 1 COMMON MKT. L. REV., 205 at paragraphs 19 and 20.
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policy). One can also imagine a more "vertical" distribution of competences. By this, we mean a situation
in which "the Community would be competent to conclude the main substantive parts of the agreement,
while Member State participation would be deemed necessary because of the nature of its obligations
relating to the implementation and enforcement of those substantive parts." 299 As an example we can take
into account the agreement considered in Ruling 1/78 (Re the Draft Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports), in which, as far as its provisions on penal
sanctions and extradition were concerned, Member State participation was required.300
One more example could be that of the 1995 UN Agreement Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. This agreement, mainly
because of its provisions on compliance and enforcement (Part VI), has been defined by the Council of
the EU as a mixed agreement. Following this line of argument, in an EC Declaration submitted upon
signature in accordance with Article 47,301 it is noted that, while the Community has exclusive

298

1994 E.C.R. I-625.
Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 130.
300
Ruling 1/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2151, at 2180 (paragraph 36).
299

301

Article 47 of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks reads:
1. In cases where an international organization referred to in article 1 of Annex IX to the Convention does not have
competence over all the matters governed by this Agreement, Annex IX to the Convention shall apply mutatis mutandis to
participation by such international organization in this Agreement, except that the following provisions of that Annex shall not
apply:
(a) article 2, first sentence; and
(b) article 3, paragraph 1.
2. In cases where an international organization referred to in article 1 of Annex IX to the Convention has competence over all
the matters governed by this Agreement, the following provisions shall apply to participation by such international
organization in this Agreement:
(a) at the time of signature or accession, such international organization shall make a declaration stating:
(i) that it has competence over all the matters governed by this Agreement;
(ii) that, for this reason, its member States shall not become States Parties, except in respect of their territories for which the
international organization has no responsibility; and
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competence with respect to the conservation and management of living marine resources, including the
regulatory competence granted under international law to the flag State in this respect, measures such as
refusal, withdrawal or suspension of authorization to serve as masters and other officers of fishing
vessels, as well as certain enforcement measures relating to the exercise of jurisdiction by the flag State
over its vessels on the high seas, are within the competence of the Member States.302
However, in many cases the provisions relating to possible "coexistent" Member States
competences may be of such a limited relevance that they should be seen as ancillary (subsidiary) to the
essential objectives of the agreement.303 The ECJ has cases on subsidiary provisions, which are often
related to Article 133 EC on common commercial policy. I would like to illustrate one case and two
opinions from the ECJ as examples of what has been previously said: Opinion 1/78 (Re Draft
International Agreement on Natural Rubber),304 Opinion 1/94 (Re WTO Agreement)305 and Case C268/94 Portugal v. Council.306 In this last case, the ECJ concludes in its paragraph 77 as follows:

Furthermore, with regard to the linking of Article 10 of the Agreement [Cooperation
Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on Partnership
and Development] to commercial policy, it is sufficient to point out that the Community is
entitled to include in external agreements otherwise falling within the ambit of Article 133
ancillary provisions for the organization of purely consultative procedures or clauses
calling on the other party to raise the level of protection of intellectual property (see, to
that effect, Opinion 1/94, paragraph 68).

(iii) that it accepts the rights and obligations of States under this Agreement;
(b) participation of such an international organization shall in no case confer any rights under this Agreement on member states
of the international organization;
(c) in the event of a conflict between the obligations of an international organization under this Agreement and its obligations
under the agreement establishing the international organization or any acts relating to it, the obligations under this Agreement
shall prevail.
302

See (1996) Law of the Sea Bulletin 32, p. 26.
Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 130.
304
1979 E.C.R. 2871 at 1917 (paragraph 56).
305
1994 E.C.R. I-5278, at I-5408 (paragraphs 66-68).
306
Judgment of 3 December 1996, paragraphs 75, 77. For an academic comment on the case, see Peers, S. “Fragmentation or
Evasion in the Community’s Development Policy? The Impact of Portugal v. Council,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.)
The General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, pp. 100-12.
303
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MacLeod et al. assert that

“the principal consequence of shared competence is that the Member States still have
power to enter into agreements and to take action in the areas in question [...]. Although
the concept of shared external competence is well established in Community law and
practice, it has not always been possible to persuade third States to recognise that the legal
powers and interests of the Community and Member States co-exist.307 Third States have
tended to insist that either the Community or the Member States should accept legal
responsibility for a given matter, and that both cannot be responsible, or exercise rights at
the same time, on the same matters. The extent to which international law recognises the
concept of "shared competence" is therefore open to debate”.308

At the same time, it must be said that the fact that Member States will have obligations concerning
the implementation and execution of the agreement does not classify the agreement as mixed. As means
of evidence, we have Opinion 1/75 (Understanding on a Local Cost Standard).309 Here the Court held that
“it is of little importance that the obligations and the financial burdens inherent to the execution of the
agreement envisaged are borne directly by the Member States.”310 Another example is Opinion 2/91 (ILO
Convention No 170).311

B.- Type of Mixity

Mixity can also be classified as facultative (non-compulsory) and obligatory, i.e. legally necessary.
Where the competence of the EC is non-exclusive but there are no competences specifically reserved for
Member States either, then as a matter of EC law this mixity becomes facultative, optional, noncompulsory. For example, the environmental agreements or development cooperation agreements. This
means that you may have pure Community agreements with shared competence. The language of the EC
Treaty makes it very clear that development cooperation is not exclusive EC competence, and yet the EC
307

This is mainly the case in the World Intellectual Property Organization.
MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford,
1996, at 63.
309
1975 E.C.R. 1355.
310
1975 E.C.R. 1361 at 1364.
311
1993 E.C.R. I-1061 at 1082 (paragraph 34).
308
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concludes concludes international agreements on its own. Thus, one must have a mixed agreement only
when part of the agreement covers matters outside EC competence altogether, but EU Member States are
free to insist on a mixed agreement whenever there is shared competence.
As Rosas argues, in cases of concurrent competences, mixity is facultative ab initio. However, if
the Council and the Member States insist on mixity for political reasons, the question arises as to whether
parts of the agreement become reserved for the Member States, in which case they should all become
Contracting Parties.312 We should also illustrate, in this same line of argument, the example of an Opinion
(No. 20/1995) given on 30 November 1995 by the Constitutional Committee to the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the Finnish Parliament. This Opinion discusses problems concerning the ratification of the
1995 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their
Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of Estonia before it was a member of the EU, on the
other.313
As far as obligatory mixity is concerned, it is understood that it is necessary to have the
participation of both the Member States and the EC on a particular issue. A classical example of
obligatory mixity is the Law of the Sea Convention, where it is highly difficult to have one voice
representing the EU. In such a case, we deal with what is called “subordination clauses,”314 which provide
that the EC can become a party only if one or more of the Member States have become parties. As an
example we have Article 3 of the Annex IX to the Law of the Sea Convention (1982),315 which advocates
that the EC may become a party only if a majority of the Member States ratifies or accedes.316
312

Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 132.
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Id. at p. 143.
314
Close, G. Subordination Clauses in Mixed Agreements (1985), 34 ICLQ, pp. 382-91.
315
Article 3 of the Annex IX to the Law of the Sea Convention reads:
1. An international organization may deposit its instrument of formal confirmation or of accession if a majority of its member
States deposit or have deposited their instruments of ratification or accession.
2. The instruments deposited by the international organization shall contain the undertakings and declarations required by
articles 4 and 5 of this Annex.
316
Simmonds, K. R. The Communities Declaration Upon Signature of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (1986) 23
COMMON MKT. L. REV., 521-44. The LOSC entered into force on 16 November 1994. However, an agreement on Part IX
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This distinction between obligatory and facultative mixity is not always recognized in practice.
Proof of it are the discussions in the framework of the Council of the EU (including COREPER and the
Working Groups) on the European Community versus mixed character of a given agreement, where it is
almost always taken for granted that the lack of exclusive Community competences requires mixity out of
necessity.317
However, it may sometimes be difficult to apply to certain cases, as can be deduced from
uncertainties such as whether Opinion 1/94 implies that Member States participation in the WTO
Agreements on services (GATS)318 and intellectual property rights (TRIPS) was legally necessary or
simply legally possible. The Commission asked the Court to rule that the Community had exclusive
competence to adhere to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), either under Article 133 EC, the ERTA doctrine,
implied powers in accordance with Opinion 1/76,319 or Articles 95 EC320 and 235 EC.321 In denying their

of the LOCS has meant that there is a much greater likelihood that more Member States will ratify. Ratification of the LOSC
by the EC is under active consideration. A delay in ratification already announced by the UK in May 1996 may delay EC
ratification.
317
Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 132, note 34.
318
For an analysis of the GATS from a European perspective, see Guild & Barth, “The Movement of Natural Persons and the
GATS: A UK Perspective and European Dilemma,” 4 European Foreign Affairs Review 395 (1999); Eeckhout, P.
“Constitutional Concepts for Free Trade in Services,” in de Burca, G. & Scott, J. (eds.) The EU and the WTO: Legal and
Constitutional Issues, Hart Publishing, 2001; Hermann, “Common Commercial Policy after Nice: Sisyphus would have done a
better job,” 39 Common Market Law Review 7 (2002); Djordjevic, “Domestic Regulation and Free Trade in Services – A
Balancing Act,” 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 305 (2002).
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Opinion 1/76 (Re the Draft Agreement for a Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels) (Rhine Navigation Case), 1977
E.C.R. 741. For an analysis of Opinion 1/76, see Hardy, M. “Opinion 1/76 of the Court of Justice,” 14 Common Market Law
Review, p. 561, 1977.
320
Article 95 EC reads:
1. By way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise provided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall
apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 14. The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure
referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation
of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the
establishment and functioning of the internal market.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free movement of persons nor to those relating to
the rights and interests of employed persons.
3. The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, environmental protection and
consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new development based
on scientific facts. Within their respective powers, the European Parliament and the Council will also seek to achieve this
objective.
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existence of exclusive competences for the whole subject areas covered by these two treaties, the Court
concluded that the GATS and TRIPS Agreement are mixed agreements. Some of the Member States had
argued that those provisions of the TRIPS Agreement fall within their competence. The Court replied that
"if that argument is to be understood as meaning that all those matters are within some sort of domain
reserved to the Member States, it cannot be accepted. The Community is certainly competent to
harmonize national rules on those matters…"322
What has been said so far concerning the types of competences in the external relations of the EU
can be graphically shown as follows:
________________________________________________________________________
A.- Type of competence
B.- Type of mixity
________________________________________________________________________
A.1.- parallel competences

facultative mixity

4. If, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it necessary
to maintain national provisions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 30, or relating to the protection of the
environment or the working environment, it shall notify the Commission of these provisions as well as the grounds for
maintaining them.
5. Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation
measure, a Member State deems it necessary to introduce national provisions based on new scientific evidence relating to the
protection of the environment or the working environment on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State arising after
the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify the Commission of the envisaged provisions as well as the grounds
for introducing them.
6. The Commission shall, within six months of the notifications as referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, approve or reject the
national provisions involved after having verified whether or not they are a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between Member States and whether or not they shall constitute an obstacle to the functioning of the
internal market.
In the absence of a decision by the Commission within this period the national provisions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5
shall be deemed to have been approved.
When justified by the complexity of the matter and in the absence of danger for human health, the Commission may notify the
Member State concerned that the period referred to in this paragraph may be extended for a further period of up to six months.
7. When, pursuant to paragraph 6, a Member State is authorised to maintain or introduce national provisions derogating from
a harmonisation measure, the Commission shall immediately examine whether to propose an adaptation to that measure.
8. When a Member State raises a specific problem on public health in a field which has been the subject of prior
harmonisation measures, it shall bring it to the attention of the Commission which shall immediately examine whether to
propose appropriate measures to the Council.
9. By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 226 and 227, the Commission and any Member State may
bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member State is making improper use of the
powers provided for in this Article.
10. The harmonisation measures referred to above shall, in appropriate cases, include a safeguard clause authorising the
Member States to take, for one or more of the non-economic reasons referred to in Article 30, provisional measures subject to
a Community control procedure.
321
Article 235 EC reads: The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in disputes relating to compensation for damage provided
for in the second paragraph of Article 288 [EC].
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A.2.- Shared competences
a.- Concurrent competences

facultative mixity

b.- Coexistent competences

obligatory mixity

b.1.- Horizontally
b.2.- Vertically

Lena Granvik denotes that "mixed agreements are concluded especially in the field of the
environment, entailing that both the European Community and some or even all of its Member States
individually become parties to the international environmental agreement."323 According to this author
there are two types of mixed agreements: complete and incomplete mixed agreements. Complete mixed
agreements means that both the EC and all its Member States are treaty-parties, whereas the concept of
incomplete mixed agreements implies that only some of the EC Member States have acceded to the
agreement in question along with the EC. However, it must be said that incomplete mixed agreements
bind all the Member States of the Community.324 What the case-law and primary legislation indicate is
that Member States, whether they are parties or not, “have the obligation to co-operate with the EC in the
implementation of the Community’s international obligations.”325 In addition to that, a mixed agreement,
which does not distinguish between the rights and obligations of the EC and the Member States, gives
obligations to both the EC and its Member States under all its provisions.

322

1994 E.C.R. I-5418-5419, paragraph 104.
Granvik, L. Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of Bindingness, in
Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998,
at 255.
324
Granvik, L. Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of Bindingness, in
Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998,
at 269.
325
Granvik, L. Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of Bindingness, in
Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998,
at 270.
323
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It should be mentioned that the above given typology should only and merely be seen as a tool to
assist in the structuring of the discussion on the legal nature an implications of mixed agreements.326
Some agreements may fall under several of these categories, as can be seen from the ILO Convention No.
170 as interpreted by the Court of Justice in its Opinion 2/91.327 In this Opinion, the Court seemed to hold
that Part III of the Convention belonged to exclusive EC competence and the other parts to non-exclusive
EC competence because the relevant Community directives set minimum standards. The representation of
certain dependent territories belonged to the competence of some Member States. However, this right of
representation is, strictly speaking, not a question of mixity, as the Member States involved do not act in
their capacity as EU Member States.328

VII. Conclusion of Mixed Agreements

There seems to be uncertainty about the nature and legal implications of joint participation by the EC and
its Member States in the conclusion of international agreements.329 Rosas argues in this respect that “the
phenomenon of mixed agreements is still surrounded by a host of question marks, both of a theoretical
and practical nature.”330 In this sense, within the legal scholarship, three main and divergent positions can
be presented: 1) one part of the doctrine has tried to reduce the mixed procedure to only exceptional cases
of some compelling legal reasons;331 2) another part of the doctrine has focused on the practical and
theoretical problems of mixed procedure, limiting EU Member States’ participation in the EC’s
326

Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in DASHWOOD, A. & HILLION, C. (eds.) THE GENERAL
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 207.
327
1993 E.C.R. I-1061.
328
Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in DASHWOOD, A. & HILLION, C. (EDS.) THE GENERAL
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 207; MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of
the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 65-66.
329
See Hartley, T. C. “National Law, International Law and EU Law - How do they Relate?” in Capps, Evans &
Konstadinidis (eds.) Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives, Hart, 2003.
330
Rosas, A. in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p.
127.
331
Pescatore, P. “External Relations in the Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities,” 16 CMLRev.
(1979) pp. 624 and 642.
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international agreements to a minimum;332 3) a third group of scholars has a more dogmatic approach to
obtain normative propositions by interpreting the various provisions of international agreements or by
extrapolation from the general schemes of EC law and international law.333

VIII. Implications of Mixed Agreements for Third Parties

In this section, we shall evaluate the validity and the effects that the EC’s international agreements have
on non-Member States of the EU.334 As we know, mixed agreements are, together with the exclusive
Community agreements, one of the two methods by which the Community undertakes contractual
international obligations.335 In fact, although no specific provision is made in the EC Treaty for joint
participation of the EC and its Member States in international agreements, the practice of concluding
mixed agreements is well established in the law of the European Community.336 This has been recognized
by the ECJ on several occasions. The recognition of the practice by the Court was first implied in cases
concerning the early agreements of association.337 The first express reference which the Court made to the
concept of mixed agreement is in Case 12/86 Demirel v. Stadt Schwaebisch Gmuend.338 Another example
is the dicta in Opinion 1/78 on the International Natural Rubber Agreement.339

332

Rosas, A. in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p.
125; Rosas, A. in DASHWOOD, A. & HILLION, C. (EDS.) THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS,
2000, p. 200; Ehlermann, C.D., in O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation
Publishers, 1983, p. 3.
333
Bleckmann, A. “Der gemischte Vertrag im Europarecht,” Europarecht, 1976, p. 301; Stein, K.D. Der gemischte Vertrag im
Recht der Ausserbeziehungen der Europaeische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin, 1986, p. 23;
Bleckmann, A. in O’KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. (EDS.) MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation
Publishers, 1983, p. 155.
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For a broader spectrum of the implications of international agreements on States, see a legal analysis by Andrew Guzman,
"THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS" (November 10, 2004). International Legal Studies Program.
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http://repositories.cdlib.org/ils/wp/8 (last visited December 13, 2005).
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Ehlermann, C. D. “Mixed Agreements: A List of Problems” in O’KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. (EDS.) MIXED
AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 3-21.
336
Heliskoski, J. Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European Community
and its Member States, Kluwer Law International, 2001, p. 2.
337
Case 96/71 Haegeman v. Commission [1972] E.C.R. 1005 concerning the 1961 Agreement with Greece.
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[1987] E.C.R. 3719, paras. 8-9.
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[1979] E.C.R. 2871, paras. 2 and 29.
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The answer to specific legal problems arising from the issue of mixity may vary depending on the
subject-matter, in other words, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the field of mixed agreements
and the responsibility and liability of the EC and its Member States vis-à-vis third States, inter alia.340
This, then, leads me to the next section.

A.- Liabilities of the EC and the Member States to Third Parties341

Within the EC legal order, the Community and the Member States are responsible for the implementation
of those parts of a mixed agreement which fall within their respective competences. The only
authoritative discussion of the liability of the Community and the Member States under a mixed
agreement is in the opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs in Case C-316/91, where he literally said:

The Lome Convention was concluded as a mixed agreement (i.e. by the Community
and its Member States jointly) and has essentially a bilateral character. This is made clear
in Article 1 which states that the Convention is concluded between the Community and its
Member States of the one part, and the ACP States of the other part. Under a mixed
agreement the Community and the Member States are jointly liable unless the provisions
of the agreement point to the opposite conclusion (Emphasis added).342

Generally, each party to an international agreement is responsible for performance of its own
obligations, and joint liability under an agreement is not usually to be presumed. However, the special
circumstances of the EC and the Member States may lead to an exception to this rule. The EC and the
Member States generally work together in pursuit of a common policy. Since it is very difficult to
determine where legal powers lie between the EC and the Member States, for the third party the most
convenient conclusion is that the EC and the Member States assume joint obligations and that they are

340

Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in DASHWOOD, A. & HILLION, C. (EDS.) THE GENERAL
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 207.
341
Nicolin, S. “Modalità di Funzionamento e di Attuazione degli Accordi Misti,” in Daniele, L. (ed.) Le Relazioni Esterne
dell’Unione Europea nel Nuovo Millennio, Giuffrè Editore, 2001, pp. 177-213.
342
1994 E.C.R. I-625, at para. 69.
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required to assure these joint obligations. The ECJ, with its emphasis on the “requirement of unity” in the
external representation of the Community, concurs. The ECJ also emphasizes this view in cases such as
Ruling 1/78 (Re Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials)343 and Case 104/81
Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg.344
In agreements where the rights and obligations of the EC and the Member States are inter-linked,
the problem of the respective liabilities of the Community and the Member States will arise quite clearly.
In other words, we are dealing here with cases where the nature of the agreement is such that a third party
is entitled to respond to Community or Member State action in one area covered by the agreement by
retaliation of another area. The main example is the WTO Agreement and those agreements associated
with it, but in principle the issue could arise in any international agreement to which the Community and
the Member States were parties. Macleod et al. go further in the explanation by saying that:

“if the action and retaliation take place in respect of matters entirely within the
competence of the Community or entirely within the competence of the Member States,
the problems are less intractable. If, however, the third party responds to action in an area
of Member State competence by retaliation in an area within the competence of the
Community, the need for close cooperation between the Community and the Member
States is evident.”345

When an agreement is covered by a general rule of the law of treaties, by which a party is
responsible for all obligations of the treaty unless it makes a reservation, we are dealing with an
agreement which is not mixed under a formal or under a substantive definition of mixed agreements. In
extreme cases, as Schermers mentions, the position might be defended that, in such a case, adherence by
the Community implies a tacit reservation in the sense that the EC cannot be held liable for matters which
are outside its competence.346 In these cases, Article 46 of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of
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1978 E.C.R. 2151, at para. 35.
1982 E.C.R. 3641, at paras. 13 and 14.
345
MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford,
1996, at 159-60.
346
Schermers, H. G. "A Typology of Mixed Agreements' in O´KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. (EDS.) MIXED
AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, p. 28.
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Treaties347 between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations
(VCLTIO)348 will apply. It reads:

1.- A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude
treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule
of its internal law of fundamental importance.
2.- An international organization may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound
by a treaty has been expressed in violation of the rules of the organization regarding
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was
manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental importance.
3.- A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State or any
international organization conducting itself in the matter in accordance with the normal
practice of States and, where appropriate, of international organizations, and in good faith.

B.- Effects on Third Parties of Mixed Agreements Concluded in Violation of EC Law

Despite the fact that the internal legal competence of the Communities and the Communities’ procedures
for concluding agreements are matters of EC law, both the validity and the effects of agreements, in
relation to third countries, concluded in the framework of any rules of EC law must be taken into
consideration in terms of international law, and not EC law.349 As Brownlie points out, the rules of
customary law on these issues are not easy to state with certainty.350
Within the doctrine, some argue that international law leaves the matter to the internal rules of the
international organization to determine the procedures by which its consent to be bound has to be
expressed. Therefore, any violation of the internal rules of the organization “vitiates the expression of

347

The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties articulates the basic rules applied to the interpretation of treaties.
These rules are increasingly important due in large measure to the growth in treaties that directly affect non-State actors, such
as corporations and individuals. For example, there has been a proliferation of treaties that govern international economic
relations, trade and investment, enable the enforcement of foreign awards and judgments, protect human rights and regulate
European integration.
348
The 1986 Vienna Convention has not yet entered into force but it follows almost to the letter the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331.
349
See in this respect MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities,
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 129-32.
350
BROWNLIE, I. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 622-24.
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such consent, and renders the agreement which has been concluded void or voidable.”351 Others believe
that the acts of a representative of an organization acting within his authority bind the organization in
international law, “even if the internal rules of the organization have not been complied with.”352 As a
matter of fact, the principles which appear in Article 46 of the 1986 VCLTIO fall somewhere between the
two previously cited schools and represent the views of the majority of jurists.
When looking carefully at Article 46 of the 1986 VCLTIO, it will be noted that agreements
concluded in the framework of an organization’s internal rules are not ipso facto void. As Macleod et al.
(1996) argue, the rule in Article 46 applies in principle in favor of the State or international organization
which has acted in violation of its own internal rules and amounts to a defence against a claim for
performance of the agreement by the “innocent” party. Therefore, the rule in Article 46 would not apply
to a State or organization which has concluded an agreement with the EC to claim that such an agreement
was void because it had been concluded against a rule of the EC’s internal legal order. The rest of Article
46 reinforces this presumption in favor of the validity of agreements which have been duly concluded.
One of the parties in the agreement must show that the violation of its internal rules was “manifest” in
order to invoke an expression of consent to be bound by that agreement. In order to determine whether a
violation is “manifest”, Article 46(3) clarifies the situation: the violation must have been “objectively
evident” to a party acting in accordance with normal practice and in good faith. In addition to that, the
internal rule involved must have been “of fundamental importance.”
Determining the extent to which the powers of the Communities relate to a given agreement is not
always easy. Sometimes the particular roles and competences of each of the Community institutions in
the process of concluding agreements may not be so obvious. In this regard, irregularities when
concluding an agreement may not be “manifest” to third parties. This is so because if an agreement which
has been irregularly concluded is voided, it could be a problem for third parties.
351

MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford,
1996, at 130.
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The ECJ supports this view in Case C-327/91 France v. Commission.353 This case concerned the
Commission’s power to conclude an agreement between the Community and the United States in relation
to competition. The Court’s opinion was that the Commission had no such power, but this did not affect
the validity of the agreement in international law: “there is no doubt… that the [Competition] Agreement
is binding on the European Communities…In the event of non-performance of the Agreement by the
Commission, therefore, the Community could incur liability at international level.”354 Thus, an agreement
concluded by, or in the name of, one of the Communities will almost always be binding on that
Community as a matter of international law. In the light of this argument, Schermers comments that:

“[Foreign States] cannot be expected to know the extent of the competence of the
Community. Whenever the Community concludes a treaty, foreign States may presume
that it has power to do so. If the Community acted beyond its powers, it will nonetheless
be bound unless it or its Member States can prove both its lack of competence and its
manifest character. The latter will be especially complicated because of the complicated
nature of EC Law.” 355

In this regard, it is pertinent to mention Article 230 EC,356 which suggests that international acts
are unusual in that, unlike other acts, they cannot be voided. From the reading of Article 230 EC, first
paragraph, however, one could interpret that it is possible to annul the conclusion of international
agreements concluded by the European Community. An example of it could be the case mentioned earlier
352

Id.
Case C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3641, at para. 25.
354
Id., at para. 25.
355
Schermers in “The Internal Effect of Community Treaty Making” in O’KEEFFE & SCHERMERS (EDS.) ESSAYS ON
EUROPEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION, Kluwer, 1982, pp. 167-78 at p. 173,
356
Article 230 EC reads:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, of acts of the
Council, of the Commission and of the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European
Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.
It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on grounds of
lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law
relating to its application, or misuse of powers.
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions bought by the European Parliament, by the
Court of Auditors and by the ECB for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives.
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person
or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decisions addressed to another person, is of direct and
individual concern to the former.
The proceedings provided for in this article shall be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or of its
353
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where the European Commission concluded an agreement vis-à-vis the USA on behalf of the EC on
competition (Case C-327/91 France v Commission).357 The French Republic argued that the Commission
had no power to conclude agreements for it is only the Council of the European Union the institution
which has competence to conclude international agreements on behalf of the EC. In this particular caselaw, in its paragraph 7, the Court literally arguments as follows (I cite the position of the ECJ):

As we know, under the first paragraph of Article 230, the Court reviews the legality of
acts of the institutions “other than recommendations or opinions.” According to the
relevant case-law, however, for the purposes of judicial review, it is not the form of the act
which matters but its effects and its content which must be verified.358 The Court pointed
out in the ERTA judgement359 that an action for annulment must be available against “all
measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to
have legal effect.”360

Concerning the European Community institutions and the Member States, it is not easy to see how
they could be obliged as a matter of EC law to give effect to an agreement which was out of the
demarcation of the EC’s powers or which had been concluded in the framework of constitutional
principles of EC law. However, as Macleod et al. mention, if agreements concluded in violation of
internal rules of EC law usually remain valid within international law and, therefore, bind on the
Community vis-à-vis third States, then the institutions and the Member States must make sure that the
rights of the third State or international organization under the agreement are respected.361 According to
Macleod et al. (1996), there are three ways by which the EU institutions and the Member States would
have to take steps to align both the internal and external effects of the agreement: 1) by withdrawing from
the agreement, supposing this is possible, 2) by rectifying the defect of EC law or practice which has
made that agreement invalid or 3) by securing the participation of the Member States in the agreement
notification of the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case
may be.
357
1994 E.C.R. I-3641.
358
See most recently, the judgment in Case C-325/91 France v Commission, 1993 E.C.R. I-3283, at paragraph 9.
359
Judgment in Case 22/70 Commission v Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, at paragraph 42.
360
Case C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3647, at paragraph. 7.
361
MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford,
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along with the Community. A good example of the second way is the Commission’s proposal for a
Council decision concluding the Competition Agreement with the U.S. which was the subject of
annulment proceedings in Case C-327/91 France v. Commission.362
However, although the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and
International Organizations or between International Organizations almost completely assimilates
international organizations to States, its main weakness is that it does not make a distinction as to treaties
between an international organization and one or more of its Member States and third parties.363
Nevertheless, the International Law Commission proposed a new Article 36 bis, which reads:

Obligations and rights arise for States members of an international organization from
the provisions of a treaty to which that organization is a party when the parties to the treaty
intend those provisions to be the means of establishing such obligations and according
such rights and have defined their conditions and effects in the treaty or have otherwise
agreed thereon, and if: a) the States members of the organization, by virtue of the
constituent instrument of that organization or otherwise, have unanimously agreed to be
bound by the said provisions of the treaty, and if: b) the assent of the States members of
the organization to be bound by the relevant provisions of the treaty has been duly brought
to the notice of the negotiating States and negotiating organizations.364

This proposal of a new Article 36 bis came into existence mainly because Member States of an
international organization appear as “third States” in regard to treaties to which the international
organization is a party. Following the words of Riphagen, “this fiction is manifestly absurd in most cases”
due to the fact that Member States are usually closely involved in the conclusion of a treaty by an
international organization and also because the other party to that treaty expects performance of the
Member States. This proposed Article 36 bis followed very closely the idea underlying Articles 34 to 37
of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. In other words, it followed the requirement of consent
of a third State. In the eyes of Professor Riphagen, Article 36 bis conserves the idea of consent, “be it
1996, at 132.
362
1994 E.C.R. I-3641. See Dec. 95/145 (1995 OJ L95/45).
363
Granvik, L. Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of Bindingness, in
Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998,
at 262-63.
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possibly given (1) before the fact, i.e. before the determination of the rights and obligations by the Treaty
concluded with the international organization, and (2) given collectively.”365 In addition, Member States
are usually very involved in the performance of the treaty.366
The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties did not address the question of direct effect. In the
eyes of Professor Riphagen, this attitude of a system of general international law ignoring the domestic
legal systems is remarkable in view of the emphasis nowadays [1987] placed on the international
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

IX.- The Panacea: The “Duty Of Close Cooperation”

The origins of the duty of close cooperation may be tracked back to the Treaties themselves,367
particularly to the duty of loyal cooperation368 derived by the Court from Articles 86 ECSC,369 192

364

Yearbook of International Law Commission 1982, Vol. II (part 2), p. 43.
CAPOTORTI, F., EHLERMANN, E.-D., FROWEIN, J., JACOBS, F., JOLIET, R., KOOPMANS, T. & KOVAR, R.
(EDS.) DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L’INTEGRATION, Nomo Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987, p. 568.
366
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F., JOLIET, R., KOOPMANS, T. & KOVAR, R. (EDS.) DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L’INTEGRATION,
Nomo Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987, pp. 565-581.
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For further discussion on the duty of loyal cooperation, see KAPTEYN, P. J. G. & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, P.
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Kluwer, 1982, chapter III, 5.2.
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The principle of loyal cooperation concerns relations between the supranational and national levels. According to Article I5 (2) of the Constitutional Treaty, it means that “[t]he Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and
refrain from any measures which jeopardize the attainment of the objectives set out in the Constitution.”
369
Article 86 of the former ECSC reads:
365

Member States undertake to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations
resulting from decisions and recommendations of the institutions of the Community and to facilitate the performance of the
Community's tasks.
Member States undertake to refrain from any measures incompatible with the common market referred to in Articles 1 and 4.
They shall make all appropriate arrangements, as far as lies within their powers, for the settlement of international accounts
arising out of trade in coal and steel within the common market and shall afford each other mutual assistance to facilitate such
settlements.
Officials of the Commission entrusted by it with tasks of inspection shall enjoy in the territories of Member States, to the full
extent required for the performance of their duties, such rights and powers as are granted by the laws of these States to their
own revenue officials. Forthcoming visits of inspection and the status of the officials shall be duly notified to the State
concerned. Officials of that State may, at its request or at that of the Commission, assist the Commission's officials in the
performance of their task.
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Euratom370 and 10 EC.371 A similar duty is contained in Article 3 TEU,372 where the Council and the
Commission are responsible for ensuring the consistency of the external activities of the Union as a whole
in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. This duty applies as
much to mixed agreements as to any other area of the Union’s activity. The European Community and the
Member States are under a legal duty to cooperate on the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of
mixed agreements.373 This duty results from the requirement of unity in the international representation of
the Community.374 Such cooperation is “all the more necessary” if the European Community cannot
become party to the agreement.
This duty to co-operate is an obligation imposed on Member States and EU institutions under
Community law as a consequence of the competence situation for EC participation in the WTO.
Formerly, the repealed Article 116 EEC was available for that purpose. It obliged Member States to
proceed within the framework of international organizations of an economic character on matters of
particular interest to the common market only by common action. However, ex-Article 116 EEC Treaty
was regrettably deleted at Maastricht. It had proven to be a useful legal basis for coordination of actions
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The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the
activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire.
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations,
security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such
consistency and shall cooperate to this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its
respective powers.
373
Young, A.R. Extending European Cooperation. The European Union and the “new” International Trade Agenda,
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of Member States and the Community in the no-man’s-land of dubious demarcation between Community
and national competences, or where the exercise of these competences was inextricably linked (for
instance, the international commodities agreements in application of the so-called Proba 20375). Yet, in
the view of EU Commissioner for trade, Mr Mandelson, this coordination may need to go further still.376
Nonetheless, ex-Article 116 EEC Treaty was not one of the most transparent provisions of the
Treaty. Where the Community was not able to act because it was not a member of the relevant
organization, Member States would have to act on its behalf, and the necessary Community action was
decided on the basis of Article 133 EC, not ex-Article 116 EEC Treaty. There is a similar issue in Article
12 TEU in relation to matters falling within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and
Article 33 TEU377 in relation to common positions in international organizations and at international
conferences in various fields covered by Title VI (Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in
Criminal Matters) of the TEU.378 It is thanks to the duty of cooperation between the EC and its Member
States that consensus can be found. With regard to cooperation obligations, Article 5 EC and Article 3 of
the TEU deal in the treaties directly with it.
With regard to mixed agreements, the duty of close cooperation first emerged in Ruling 1/78,379
on a European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) case.380 The Court had to adjudicate on the division
of powers between Euratom and the Member States with regard to a draft Convention on the Physical
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Protection of Nuclear Materials. The Court said that “the draft convention...can be implemented as
regards the Community only by means of a close association between the institutions of the Community
and the Member States both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfillment of the
obligations entered into”.381 Regarding the implementation of the convention, the Court said that the
Community would implement measures falling within its competence, the Member States would
implement measures falling within their competence, and the Council would arrange for coordination of
the actions of each.382
Since the essence of mixed agreements383 is that some of their provisions fall within the
competence of the Community, while others fall within the competence of the Member States, it is hard
to precisely divide powers between the Member States and the Communities within an agreement. The
European Court of Justice has discouraged attempts to allocate competence between the Member States
and the Community.384 Instead, when considering issues dealing with mixed agreements, the Court has
emphasized the need for common action, or close cooperation, between the Community and its Member
States “in close association” with each other in the negotiation and implementation of mixed
agreements.385 The duty of cooperation, which follows from what the Court calls the “requirement of
unity in the international representation of the Community,”386 is one of the fundamental principles of the
external relations of the Communities.
In Opinion 2/91 (Re ILO Convention 170),387 the Court had to deal with an agreement that
covered matters falling within the exclusive competence of the Community, matters where both the
Community and its Member States shared competence, and matters within the competence of the Member
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383
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States. The Court said:

“[A]t paragraphs 34 to 36 in Ruling 1/78, the Court pointed out that when it appears
that the subject matter of an agreement falls in part within the competence of the
Community and in part within the competence of the Member States, it is important to
ensure that there is a close association between the institutions of the Community and the
Member States both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfillment of
the obligations entered into. This duty of cooperation, to which attention was drawn in the
context of the EAEC Treaty, must also apply in the context of the EEC Treaty since it
results from the requirement of unity in the international representation of the Community.
(37) In this case, cooperation between the Community and the Member States is
all the more necessary in view of the fact that the former cannot, as international law
stands at present, itself conclude an ILO Convention and must do so through the medium
of the Member States.
(38) It is therefore for the Community institutions and the Member States to take
all the measures necessary so as best to ensure such cooperation both in the procedure of
submission to the competent authority388 and ratification of Convention 170 and in the
implementation of commitments resulting from that Convention.”389

The agreement under consideration in Opinion 2/91 was not a mixed agreement stricto sensu. The
Community could not formally become a party to it.390 This limitation may stem from ILO provisions
restricting membership and participation only to States. However, the agreement did involve matters
within the competence of the Community and of the Member States.
As we have already analyzed, the issue of cooperation between the Member States and the
Community institutions was raised even more acutely in Opinion 1/94. The context of the WTO also
shows that in areas of non-exclusive EC competence, it is necessary to have coordinated action in an EC
framework.391 It is important to note that non-exclusive EC competence does not mean non-existent EC
competence. In areas of non-exclusive EC competence, the EC can, if the EU Council of Ministers so
decides, enter into agreements with third countries without formal adherence of EU Member States to
these agreements, thereby having a so-called pure Community agreement. However, Member States
388

(footnote original) i.e. in the ILO.
Opinion 2/91, paragraphs 36 ff, 1993 E.C.R. I-1061.
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In this sense, Professor Torrent speaks of a fourth pillar, meaning by that the use of national competences in a European
Union framework. See Torrent, R. “Le quatrième pilier de l’Union Européenne”, in BOURGEOIS, J. DEWOST, J.-L. &
GAIFFE, M.-A. (EDS.) LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE ET LES ACCORDS MIXTES, Collège d’Europe, 1997, pp.
49-63.
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normally insist on the mixity of international agreements, even if mixity would not be legally necessary.
Speaking with one voice, in many domains, has to be ensured through cooperation between the EC and its
Member States, with the idea of achieving unity of representation.392
Therefore, the basic principle is that in all aspects of the negotiation, conclusion and
implementation of a mixed agreement, the Member States and the Community are required to co-operate
closely and act in close association. This duty of cooperation applies to agreements involving any of the
Communities, and is binding on the institutions of the Community as well as the Member States. It is also
important to define the EU’s interpretation of coordination and cooperation.

A.- Community Coordination

When engaged in proceedings involving a mixed agreement, both Member States and the EU institutions
are obliged to inform each other of their positions, to seek to reach a common view on matters that fall
within the scope of a mixed agreement, and to proceed by common action within the framework of
international bodies.393 This involves meetings between the representatives of the Member States and the
institutions (usually the Commission) to seek a common position. These meetings are called Community
co-ordination and take place within the framework of the Council, either in Brussels or in an international
forum in which the Community and the Member States are participants.394 Community co-ordination in
the negotiation of international agreements is well established in practice. There are informal
understandings between the Commission and the Council. For example, there are co-ordination
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arrangements in international commodity agreements and in international organizations, particularly in
the FAO and the UN.395

B.- Close Cooperation And Unity of Representation Principle

Trying to reach an agreement on a common position will inevitably lead to difficulties and disagreements.
For example, a Member State may wish to take a position different from that of the Community and its
partners during the negotiation of an agreement. An agreement also may not be of equal relevance among
all the Member States. Therefore, the question arises whether the duty of cooperation requires all the
Member States to reach a common position or just to use their best effort to reach such a position. In the
end, each Member State will have to defend its own interests.
It is important to distinguish between failure to agree on a position on matters falling within the
exclusive competence of the EC, and failure to agree on a common position on matters where the
Community and Member States share competences. With regard to matters exclusively within the
Member State competence, the EC Treaties have in principle nothing to say (although the provisions of
Titles V and VI TEU may be relevant).396
In those cases where a common position between the Community and the Member States cannot
be reached, Member States will be able to express their own national views on matters within national
competence and exercise their national powers. Support for this proposition may be derived from the
practice of the EU Council. In addition, there are instances in which a Member State might claim that its
participation in an agreement was contrary to its national interests or for some other reason undesirable or
even impossible.
395
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C.- Some Preliminary Conclusions

The legal position governing the participation of the EC and its Member States in international trade
agreements/negotiations is flexible and allows arrangements to be agreed which can suit the
circumstances of the particular international organization in question while recognizing the position of the
EC and its Member States. With good political will and common sense on all sides such arrangements can
work.397 Proof of this is the successful outcome of the Uruguay Round and the conclusion of the financial
services negotiations in the framework of the WTO in the summer of 1995. In this last case, the EC took
the lead during the negotiations as a result of combined efforts of the European Commission and the
Member States: the United Kingdom, given its position as the EU country with the major financial
services industry within the EU, was better placed to lobby in some parts of the world than the European
Commission.398 Finally, I would like to argue that it is in the interest of the EC and its Member States to
use their combined weight to the best effect. The practical application of the duty of co-operation must
recognize that it is to their advantage to do so.
To better understand the Member States’ perspective on mixed competences, we will look at one
national court’s interpretation of the EC’s role.

X. Conclusion

To sum up this article, and following the line of thought of Timmermans and Völker (1981), mixed
agreements are one of the most distinctive features of the external relations law and practice of the
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Communities as well as one of the most difficult.399 Three types of competence are covered by an
international agreement: 1) competence exclusively with the Community; 2) competence shared between
the Community and the Member States; 3) competence exclusively with the Member States.400 In the case
where the Community is the only one competent for matters covered by an international agreement, then
the Community alone should become party to that agreement. However, there are some cases where even
if the substance of the agreement is of exclusive Community competence, the participation of Member
States may also be necessary.401 In such cases it is important to distinguish between the theoretical
situation and how it is in practice. Theoretically speaking, in these cases Member States do not participate
in the table of negotiations alongside the European Community.402 Nevertheless, in practical terms the
agreement itself may require the participation of Member States in the agreement so that the Community
can exercise its competences and participate effectively.403
In the case where Member States and the Community share competence, there are several ways to
carry out this task. Some of the obligations in the agreement may have to do with matters for which the
Community is exclusively competent. Others have to do with issues for which the Member States are
exclusively competent.404 Sometimes it is so that by virtue of the provisions of the Treaties the agreement
is related to an area in which the Member States and the Community share competence to act. On other
occasions, the agreement may deal with issues where the powers of the Member States and the
Community run in parallel so that each has an independent and separate interest in participating in the
agreement. Explained in the words of MacLeod et al.,
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"where competence for the subject matter of an agreement is shared between
the Community and the Member States, the full implementation of the obligations
in the agreement will usually require the participation in the agreement of the
Communities and the Member States together, each in respect of their powers and
interests."405
In the view of Allan Rosas, “pure Community agreements may be preferred not only by the
Commission but sometimes also by some or all of the Member States, mainly in order to speed up the
process and avoid complications of various sorts. There have been situations where third States, out of
similar considerations, have expressed a preference for a pure Community agreement.”406 A practical
alternative seems to be the adoption of soft law instruments in the form of a declaration plan, which may
be adopted by the Council and in some cases also signed by the Council Presidency and/or the
Commission, but without the need of 25 national ratifications. Examples are the Barcelona Declaration
adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 27-28 November 1995 and the New Transatlantic
Agenda signed by President Clinton, Prime Minister González of Spain (representing the then Spanish
Council Presidency) and President Santer of the European Commission.407 It is important to note, though,
that what I describe here are soft alternatives to treaty-making as a whole, not to the mixed form of treatymaking.
With regard to treaties, and notably bilateral agreements, one could try to devise the negotiation
directives to be adopted by the Council,408 and to conduct the actual negotiations in order to avoid areas
of national competence. Member States are often unwilling to authorize the Community alone to
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conclude bilateral agreements containing concurrent competences.409 An example would be the existence
of substantive provisions relating to intellectual property rights (as well as in services and direct
investment). Such provisions in a bilateral agreement would almost inevitably lead to mixity, as some
Member States seem to interpret Opinion 1/94 as establishing exclusive national competence in this field.
On the potential competence of the Community to conclude international agreements in the field of
intellectual property rights, it is pertinent to see Case C-53/96 Hermes International.410 The Commission
may try to avoid provisions on questions such as intellectual property rights, services, investment or
monetary policy in order to avoid assertions of mixity.
Development cooperation agreements and environmental agreements often belong to the category
of concurrent competences above mentioned, as concurrent competences are spelled out in the EC
Treaty,411 but a potential competence may exist in many other areas such as intellectual property rights,
investment or services, covered by the EC Treaty as well. It remains to be seen to what extent the EU
Council will agree to the Community becoming a party to such agreements and conventions, without
insisting on Member States’ participation. In most cases, this will probably not be the case and mixity
will continue to exist.412 The fact that the Nice Intergovernmental Conference in December 2000 did not
want to broaden Article 133 EC so as to cover all questions of services, intellectual property rights, and
investment is a clear sign of the unwillingness of Member States to give up mixity even in areas of
commercial policy. Another example is that of a trade and cooperation agreement negotiated with South
Africa that Member States refused to accept in the spring of 1999 as a pure Community agreement, even
if it was obvious that there was no legal need to conclude the agreement as a mixed agreement. The
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agreement was signed on October 11, 1999.413 While the Commission preferred a Community agreement,
the great majority of Member States wanted the agreement to become mixed.
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